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I. INTRODUCTION
Should a small business be put at risk of insolvency for sending
advertisements by fax to prospective customers?  Or have to spend
thousands of dollars on legal fees to defend itself in court?  Or be
forced to “pay off” a plaintiff’s lawyer to avoid litigation?  Though the
intuitive answer is “no,” questions like these were overlooked in 1991
and again in 2005 when Congress responded to concerns about the
costs of unsolicited facsimile advertising.1  As a result, the cottage in-
dustry of “junk fax”2 lawsuits that has developed and flourished in the
last two decades has forced many small businesses—many of which
had no idea they were breaking the law—to face these serious issues.3
The history of junk fax litigation shows that any real benefit bestowed
by this legislation is outweighed by the harm to these small busi-
nesses—these “innocent lawbreakers.”4  As this Article will explain, if
Congress will not act to remedy this imbalance, it is time for the
courts to step in to bring balance to junk fax litigation.
Technological advances of the 1980s made new forms of advertis-
ing possible and economical.  No longer were advertisers limited to
sending solicitations through the mail or to calling consumers by tele-
1. E.g., 151 Cong. Rec. H5,264 (daily ed. June 28, 2005) (statement of  Rep.
Markey).
2. A junk fax is, like junk mail, nothing more than an unsolicited advertisement.
Only the method of delivery is different.  Subsection III.C.2 explores whether all
such advertisements are “junk.”
3. See, e.g., Letter from Dan Danner, Executive Vice President, Pub. Policy and Po-
litical, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., to Kevin Martin, Chairman, Fed. Commc’n
Comm’n (Jan. 13, 2006) (on file with author) (“Many of these [lawsuits] are un-
founded and require businesses to defend themselves in distant locations or settle
business claims to avoid the cost of litigation.”).
4. As discussed in section V.B, commercial facsimile advertising operations that
send thousands of facsimile advertisements on behalf of clients are excluded from
my definition of innocent lawbreakers.
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phone.5  The introduction and gradual ubiquity of facsimile machines
allowed advertisers to send their message to consumers6 without hav-
ing to pay costs of printing and postage.  Unlike traditional junk mail,
which costs consumers no more than the minor inconvenience of
throwing a piece of mail in the trash, receiving an unsolicited facsim-
ile (at least in the 1990s) forced the consumer to pay for the ink and
paper used to print the document.7  Responding to the proliferation of
this new advertising technique, Congress enacted the Telephone Con-
sumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA or the Act),8 which sought to pro-
hibit all forms of unsolicited commercial9 advertising using facsimile
machines.  The Act also created a private cause of action for enforce-
ment of the anti-junk fax provisions.10
This private cause of action has led to a proliferation of litigation
seeking to hold senders of unsolicited advertisements financially lia-
ble for violations of the statute.11  But unlike traditional measures of
damages where the aggrieved party can, excepting extraordinary cir-
cumstances, recover only its actual losses, the TCPA allows for the
recovery of damages which can be tens of thousands of times higher
than their actual loss.12  This potential windfall has led to a cottage
industry of lawyers and litigants whose primary vocation has become
5. Though the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 also regulates aspects of
direct telephone solicitations, except as discussed in section VI.A, this Article’s
scope is limited to regulations concerning the use of facsimile machines to trans-
mit commercial solicitations.
6. As will be discussed later, the Act is not restricted to “consumers” as that term is
commonly understood—that is, an individual who utilizes economic goods. See
WEBSTER’S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 490 (2002).  Instead, the Act ap-
plies equally to individuals and business entities, large and small. See Boydston
v. Asset Acceptance LLC, 496 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (“The
TCPA entitles individual citizens to relief for the receipt of unsolicited telephone
or fax advertisements . . . .” (emphasis added)).
7. Whether the receipt of a facsimile advertisement is any more inconvenient than a
phone call during dinner or receiving junk mail is up for debate. See infra subsec-
tion III.C.1.  As discussed in section III.A, more recent advancements in facsimile
technology and business practices have changed the cost-shifting dynamic.
8. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) (2000), amended by the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005,
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C)(i)–(iii) (2006).
9. The Act does not prohibit all unsolicited facsimile transmissions.  It permits un-
solicited faxes from charitable and political organizations. 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(5)
(“The term ‘unsolicited advertisement’ means any material advertising the com-
mercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is trans-
mitted to any person without that person’s prior express invitation or permission,
in writing or otherwise.” (emphasis added)); see also Missouri ex rel Nixon v. Am.
Blast Fax, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 920, 934 (E.D. Mo. 2002) (holding  the TCPA is
unconstitutional because of the distinction it makes between commercial and
non-commercial transmissions), rev’d, 323 F.3d 649 (8th Cir. 2003).
10. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3).  The Act also allows for enforcement actions by state attor-
neys general. Id. § 227(f)(1); see infra subsection II.C.2.a.
11. See infra subsection II.C.2.b.
12. See infra section III.B.
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the filing of TCPA-related lawsuits.13 The TCPA was designed to ad-
dress the harm caused by unsolicited facsimile advertising.  But it has
also spawned a cottage industry of attorneys who prey upon innocent
law breakers—people and businesses who were never the TCPA’s in-
tended targets.
This Article explores the history behind using facsimile machines
as advertising tools, the enactment of the anti-junk fax provisions of
the TCPA, and then explains why the TCPA, as generally interpreted
by the courts, fails to strike the correct balance between consumer pro-
tection and the protection of small businesses that unintentionally
run afoul of the law—innocent lawbreakers.  After explaining why in-
nocent lawbreakers deserve protection from those who seek to abuse
the Act for pecuniary gain, I will suggest several approaches (using
both traditional and non-traditional legal theories) to the application
of the Act that will help even the scales in the adjudication of TCPA
cases, thus maintaining the Act’s core mission of protecting consumers
from unwarranted and costly intrusions, but at the same time, saving
innocent lawbreakers from insolvency.
II. FACSIMILE MACHINES, ADVERTISING, AND THE TCPA
The junk-fax provision of the Act has generated volumes of litiga-
tion against companies (large and small) that sought to use new tech-
nologies to advertise their wares and services.14  This provision
generally forbids any person from using “any telephone facsimile ma-
chine, computer, or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile ma-
chine, an unsolicited advertisement.”15  To understand how the
13. See infra section V.A.
14. E.g., Bonime v. Avaya Inc., No. 06 CV 1630(CBA), 2006 WL 3751219 (E.D.N.Y.
Dec. 20, 2006); Covington & Burling v. Int’l Mktg. & Research, Inc., No. CIV.A.
01-0004360, 2003 WL 21384825 (D.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 17, 2004); Texas v. Am.
Blastfax, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 892 (W.D. Tex. 2003).  The Act also regulates cer-
tain telemarketing activities, which, though not the focus of this Article, are dis-
cussed in section VI.A.
15. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) (2006).  The general prohibition on the use of fax ma-
chines to send unsolicited emails does not exist if the sender and recipient have
an “established business relationship” and certain other conditions are met. Id.
The established business relationship exception was added to the Act by the Junk
Fax Prevention Act of 2005, see infra subsection II.C.3, codifying the Federal
Communications Commission rule on the subject. See 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(3)(i)
(2010); § 64.1200(f)(3) (“The term emergency purposes means calls made neces-
sary in any situation affecting the health and safety of consumers.”); In re Rules
and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991,
18 FCC Rcd. 16972 (2003); In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Tele-
phone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 7 FCC Rcd. 8752, 8779 n.87 (1992).
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TCPA’s  junk fax prohibition came to be, we must understand the ori-
gin of the telephone facsimile machine.16
A. Development and Design of Telephone Facsimile
Machines
The commercially viable, modern telephone facsimile machine—
one capable of transmitting both text and monochrome images over a
telephone line—has its roots in the mid-1970s.17  This modern and
once-ubiquitous18 facsimile machine (the kind the drafters clearly had
in mind)19 is defined in the TCPA as follows:
The term “telephone facsimile machine” means equipment which has the
capacity (A) to transcribe text or images, or both, from paper into an electronic
signal and to transmit that signal over a regular telephone line, or (B) to tran-
scribe text or images (or both) from an electronic signal received over a regular
telephone line onto paper.20
The introduction of the modern facsimile machine allowed individ-
uals and businesses to transmit documents much more quickly and
cheaply than using the mail or overnight delivery services.  A cus-
tomer could transmit an order to a supplier instantaneously.  A lawyer
could send a letter to opposing counsel across the country without
waiting days for mail delivery.  A doctor could deliver a report to a
consulting physician across town without paying for a courier.  And a
business could notify its customers of a special promotion without pay-
ing for postage.  This last use led to the proliferation of unwanted fac-
simile advertisements, an industry to send them, and ultimately, the
enactment of the TCPA.
16. The term “facsimile” comes from the Latin facio simile, which means “make like.”
OXFORD LATIN DICTIONARY 668–69, 1763 (P.G.W. Glare ed., 1982).  The world’s
first facsimile machine—that is, a machine that was capable of transmitting text
across an electrical wire—was patented by Alexander Bain in 1843. See generally
STEPHEN VAN DULKEN, INVENTING THE 19TH CENTURY 84 (2001).  The first com-
mercial fax system, based on a design by Italian Giovanni Caselli, was set up in
1863 between the French cities of Paris and Lyon.  7 SCIENCE AND ITS TIMES 534
(Neil Schlager ed., 2000).  As early as 1902, German inventor Arthur Korn per-
fected a design that allowed users to send and receive photographs. Id. By 1906,
this device was commercially available and widely used, especially in the newspa-
per industry. Id.  But this is not the machine that comes to mind today when one
talks about a fax machine.
17. See KENNETH MCCONNELL ET AL., FAX: FASCIMILE TECHNOLOGY & SYSTEMS 62, 67
(3d. ed. 1999) (noting that the adoption of the Group 2 standard in 1976 “opened
the door to universal fax machines”).
18. See, e.g., Robin Carol and Carter Rogers, Use of Fax Machines Declines Among
Students; Fax Machines Still Useful in the Workplace, THE TUFTS DAILY, Apr. 30,
2010, available at http://www.tuftsdaily.com/use-of-fax-machines-declines-
among-students-1.2256256.
19. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-317, at 10 (1991) (“Facsimile machines are designed to
accept, process, and print all messages.”).
20. 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(3) (emphasis added).
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B. Development of the Junk Fax Industry
Though the modern “traditional” facsimile machines have their
roots in the 1970s, the technology that allowed for computer-based fac-
simile broadcasting was not invented until the mid-1980s.21  The in-
vention of computer-based fax boards by GammaLink Corp. allowed
for the handling of multiple, simultaneous transmissions, and sparked
the fax transmission industry.22
By 1988, fax server software was developed to enable computer
networks to send and receive facsimiles from shared telephone lines.23
This, in turn, led to the formation of companies who provided fax
transmission and receiving services for clients.24  Marketing and com-
munications companies were now able to hire faxing service providers
to program a computer to transmit large quantities of faxes.25  Some
of the earliest users of this new technology were in the public relations
field to fax press releases, and political organizations that faxed advo-
cacy information to elected officials.26  In fact, this may have been a
marketing faux pas for the ages, because had Congress not received
such a multitude of faxes, some believe junk fax legislation would
have never been promulgated.27
As the number of facsimile machines used by businesses grew to
almost ubiquity, marketing companies sought to take advantage of
this new medium to send advertising messages to potential customers
at a relatively low cost.  This led to the formation of a number of blast
faxers—businesses that combined computer faxing technology with
databases of millions of telephone facsimile numbers to send fax ad-
vertisement on behalf of clients.  The most notorious of these compa-
nies, Fax.com, advertised on its web-site that it could “ ‘[b]roadcast
faxes to millions of customers daily . . .’ using its database that ‘ex-
21. Letter from Maury Kauffman, President, The Kauffman Grp. Inc., to Fed.
Commc’n Comm’n, at 2 (Nov. 30, 2002), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/
document/view?id=6513396899.
22. Id. at 2–3.
23. Id. at 3.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. It should be noted that the TCPA did not prohibit political advocacy faxing
because such faxes are not “advertising”—that is, they do not “advertis[e] the
commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services.”  47 U.S.C.
§ 227(a)(5) (2006).
27. Letter from Maury Kauffman, supra note 21, at 3 (“[H]ad congressional offices
NOT been one of the earliest targets of personalized fax broadcasting campaigns,
(members of Congress received disproportionately, a significantly higher number
of faxes as compared to consumers and businesses at large); restrictions on fac-
simile-based advertising, etc, would never have been included in what is essen-
tially a law restricting telemarketing: the TCPA.”).
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ceeds 30 million fax numbers.’”28  One anti-junk fax organization
claims that Fax.com “used to be the world’s #1 fax broadcaster of junk
faxes.  They sent over half the junk faxes in America; they sent more
faxes than their next two closest competitors combined; about 1 to 2M
a day.”29
Other companies that formed to broadcast huge quantities of faxes
included the also infamous American Blast Fax,30 which was the main
defendant in the Missouri case that, for a short time, held the anti-
junk fax provisions of the TCPA unconstitutional.31  Subsection
IV.B.1, infra, discusses how companies like Fax.com and American
Blast Fax were put out of business.
C. Congress’s Solution to the Perceived Problem of Junk
Faxes—Passage of the TCPA
One court described the reason Congress enacted the TCPA:
[T]he TCPA was enacted because state laws that attempted to regulate
telemarketing were ineffective because of telemarketers’ ability to “avoid the
restrictions of State law, simply by locating their phone centers out of state.
Congress thus sought to put the TCPA on the same footing as state law, essen-
tially supplementing state law where there were perceived jurisdictional
gaps.”32
Commentators have noted two reasons, as set out in the Congres-
sional reports, for the strict prohibition against fax marketing: the
prevention of cost-shifting and the invasion of privacy.33  Cost shifting
is considered a sound justification for the fax provision “due to the
unique architecture of faxing technology, of which paper and ink are
essential components.”34  To compensate the unwitting fax advertise-
ment recipient, and presumably, to deter violations, the Act provides
for statutory damages.35  Congress thought these statutory damages
28. Covington & Burling v. Int’l Mktg. & Research, Inc., No. CIV.A. 01-0004360, 2003
WL 21384825, at *3 (D.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 17, 2004).
29. Fax.com, JUNKFAX.ORG, http://www.junkfax.org/fax/profiles/faxcom.htm (last vis-
ited Feb. 18, 2011).
30. American Blast Fax, JUNKFAX.ORG, http://junkfax.org/fax/profiles/American-
BlastFax.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2011).
31. Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 920 (E.D. Mo.
2002), rev’d, 323 F.3d 649 (8th Cir. 2003).
32. Bonime v. Avaya Inc., No. 06 CV 1630(CBA), 2006 WL 3751219, at *5 (E.D.N.Y.
Dec. 20, 2006) (citation omitted).  The Act itself demonstrates that it was meant
to supplement, rather than preempt, state laws regulating similar conduct.  47
U.S.C. § 227(f)(1) (“State law not preempted”).
33. Jennifer A. Williams, Note, Faxing it in: How Congress Failed Consumers with
the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 345, 353–54 (2006).
34. Id. at 354.
35. 47 U.S.C § 227(b)(3).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\90-1\NEB104.txt unknown Seq: 9 30-AUG-11 12:49
78 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:70
were fair.36  Whether they are, indeed, fair to both the recipient and
sender is discussed later.37
The privacy right advanced by the junk fax prevention aspect of
the TCPA was slightly different than that of the telephone.  “The pri-
vacy right thought to be infringed by unsolicited junk faxes was that
of the recipient to use and control his or her own machine. . . . Con-
gress sought to prevent junk faxes from impeding or prohibiting the
transmission of consumers’ legitimate business faxes.”38
Many courts that later interpreted the policies behind the Act sup-
ported the idea that these types of faxes were invasions of privacy,
instead of only impediments to commerce.39
1. Congress’s Stated Intent in Passing the TCPA
In introducing what would become the TCPA, Senator Hollings,
the bill’s main sponsor in the Senate,40 believed that the evil sought to
be prevented by the Act was twofold.  First, he wanted to keep un-
wanted faxes from tying up recipients’ phone lines, thus keeping them
free for legitimate business purposes.41  Second, he thought that it
was patently unfair for the recipients to have to bear the cost of send-
ing these unwanted advertisements.42
Additionally, the House and Senate committee reports provide sig-
nificant insight into Congress’s intent in passing the TCPA.  For in-
stance, the House Committee did not want “to make all unsolicited
telemarketing or facsimile advertising illegal.”43  But it found that
“the facsimile machine ha[d] become a primary tool for business to
relay instantaneously written communications and transactions.”44
Using this technological tool, “[a]n advertiser’s facsimile machine can
36. 137 CONG. REC. S16205–06 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hollings)
(“The amount of damages in this legislation is set to be fair to both consumer and
telemarketer.”).
37. See infra Part V.
38. Williams, supra note 33, at 355.
39. Id.
40. See 137 CONG. REC. S9840-02 (daily ed. July 11, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hol-
lings) (“[T]oday I am introducing the Automated Telephone Call Protection Act of
1991.  This bill will ban computerized telephone calls to the home and so-called
junk fax.”).
41. Id. (“This bill . . . prohibits unsolicited advertisements sent to fax machines,
known as junk fax. . . . These unsolicited advertisements prevent the owners from
using their own fax machines for business purposes.”).
42. Id. (“Even worse, these transmissions force the recipient to pay for the cost of the
paper used to receive them.  These junk fax advertisements can be a severe im-
pediment to carrying out legitimate business practices and ought to be
abolished.”).
43. H.R. REP. NO. 102-317, at 6 (1991); S. REP. NO. 102-78, at 1968 (1991) (“The pur-
poses of the bill are to protect privacy interests . . . by restricting certain uses of
facsimile machines.” (emphasis added)).
44. H.R. REP. NO. 102-317, at 10.
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easily deliver tens of thousands of unsolicited messages per week to
other facsimile machines across the country.”45
The Committee concluded that the proposed ban on unsolicited fac-
simile advertising was wise because it stopped junk faxers from tying
up the recipient’s phone lines and prevented them from shifting the
costs of their advertising campaign onto the general public.46
The Senate Committee Report recognized that the TCPA would
place a burden on businesses seeking to advertise by facsimile ma-
chine, but noted that the burden to determine if the potential recipient
consented to the fax was “the minimum necessary to protect unwilling
recipients from receiving fax messages that are detrimental to the
owner’s uses of his or her fax machine.”47
2. The TCPA’s Enforcement Mechanisms
Congress created two mechanisms for enforcement of the TCPA—
one public and the other private.48  In a somewhat unconventional
scheme,49 the public enforcement mechanism rests with either (or
both) state attorneys general who may bring suits for injunctive relief
and damages in federal courts, and with the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) which is empowered to take administrative action,
including the imposition of civil forfeitures, against violators.50  The
private enforcement mechanism allows for any person who received
an unsolicited facsimile advertisement to bring an action (usually in
state court) for injunctive relief and actual or statutory damages.51
i. Public Enforcement
The Act gives state attorneys general the right to bring suit in fed-
eral court for violations of the TCPA when the attorney general “has
reason to believe that any person has engaged or is engaging in a pat-
tern or practice of telephone calls or other transmissions to residents
45. Id. at 6–7.
46. Id. at 10 (“Facsimile machines are designed to accept, process, and print all
messages which arrive over their dedicated lines.  The Fax advertiser takes ad-
vantage of this basic design by sending advertisements to available fax numbers,
knowing that it will be received and printed by the recipient’s machine.  This type
of telemarketing is problematic for two reasons.  First, it shifts some of the costs
of advertising from the sender to the recipient.  Second, it occupies the recipient’s
facsimile machine so that it is unavailable for legitimate business messages while
processing and printing the junk fax.”).
47. S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 1975–76 (1991).
48. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3), (e)(5)–(6) (2006).
49. Weitzner v. Vaccess Am., Inc., 5 Pa. D. & C. 5th 95, 2008 WL 4491534 (2008)
(“The statutory scheme behind the TCPA, although not unique, is somewhat
unusual.”).
50. 47 U.S.C. § 227(e)(5)(A).
51. Id. § 227(b)(3).
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of that State in violation of” the TCPA or regulations promulgated
under the TCPA.52  The attorney general can seek both injunctive re-
lief and monetary damages of up to $1,500 per violation.53
The consumer protection divisions of state attorneys general’s of-
fices are generally inundated with all varieties of complaints from con-
sumers who believe that they have been defrauded or otherwise
injured by unscrupulous businesses.  The types of complaints vary
widely from foreclosure rescue scams,54 to foreign lottery frauds,55 to
debt collection abuses.56  Limited resources, coupled with the large va-
riety of complaints, require state attorneys general to be selective in
deciding when to bring suit—often reserving actions under the TCPA
to egregious violators.57  Because they are public servants, attorneys
general must also be mindful of the greater good in considering the
types of damages to seek and how far to pursue cases.  Ultimately,
their goal is to stop the unlawful action, not to increase the state
treasury.58
In addition to complaining to their state’s attorney general, con-
sumers who received unsolicited fax advertisements can easily com-
plain to the FCC using an on-line form on the Commission’s web
site.59  After receiving a complaint, or more likely multiple com-
plaints, the “FCC can issue warning citations and impose fines
against companies violating or suspected of violating the junk fax
rules, but does not award individual damages.”60  Like state attorneys
general, the FCC is charged with regulating, monitoring, and enforc-
52. Id. § 227(g)(1)–(2).
53. Id. § 227(g)(1) (The state may demand injunctive relief and/or monetary damages
to recover “actual monetary loss” or $500 per violation; if the court finds that the
violation was willful or knowing, it may award up to $1,500 per violation).
54. See, e.g., Ohio Attorney General Richard Cordray, Cordray Focuses on Foreclo-
sure Rescue Scams in Ohio (June 17, 2010), http://loanworkout.org/2010/06/free-
dom-equity-savings-ohio-ag-sues-foreclosure-recue-firm.
55. See, e.g., Ask the Attorney General: Foreign Lotteries, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL: STATE OF CONNECTICUT, http://www.ct.gov/ag/cwp/view.asp?A=2219&
Q=295688 (last visited Feb. 18, 2011).
56. See, e.g., Attorney General Cuomo Sues WNY Debt Collection Companies That
Harassed And Threatened Consumers Nationwide, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL: STATE OF NEW YORK (June 1, 2010), http://www.ag.ny.gov/media_center/
2010/june/june1a_10.html.
57. For examples of the more egregious violations, see infra subsection IV.B.1.
58. See, e.g., Texas v. Am. Blastfax, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 892, 897 (W.D. Tex. 2003).
59. See File a Complaint, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, http://esupport.fcc.gov/com-
plaints.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2011).
60. Fax Advertising: What You Need to Know, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, http://
www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/unwantedfaxes.html (last visited May 14, 2011).
The FCC’s authority to impose a civil forfeiture for violations of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934, as amended (of which the TCPA is a part), is found in 47 U.S.C.
§ 503(b)(1) (2006).  The FCC has noted that it “has the authority under this sec-
tion of the Act to assess a forfeiture against any person who has ‘willfully or re-
peatedly failed to comply with any of the provisions of this Act or of any rule,
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ing rules against a myriad of telecommunications-related industries.
The FCC’s resources are similarly limited and it must also reserve its
enforcement authority to serious violators. One FCC official is re-
ported as saying that though he had heard of lawyers “ambulance
chasing” for TCPA cases, the Act “was intended to protect consumers
from real damage in the form of lost time and resources.”61  The offi-
cial added that in most cases where the recipient received one or two
unwanted faxes, “a simple telephone call, rather than a court case, is
often the place to start.”62
ii. Private Right of Action
In addition to providing for the TCPA’s enforcement by state and
federal officials, the Act created a right of action for anyone aggrieved
by the receipt of an unsolicited commercial facsimile.63  This private
right of action was a late amendment to the Senate bill, designed to
allow consumers to appear, without an attorney, in a state small
claims court to recover damages in an amount that would make it
worth their while to file suit.64  It is codified in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3):
A person or entity may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court
of a State, bring in an appropriate court of that State—(A) an action based on
a violation of this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsec-
tion to enjoin such violation, (B) an action to recover for actual monetary loss
from such a violation, or to receive $500 in damages for each such violation,
whichever is greater, or (C) both such actions.
Interestingly, though the TCPA is a federal statute, until recently,
the vast majority of courts that considered the issue held that, under
this statutory scheme, “federal question jurisdiction for this federally
authorized private right to a cause of action [is vested] exclusively in
state courts.”65  One court even went so far as to characterize the
regulation, or order issued by the Commission under this Act . . . .” In re First
Choice Healthcare, Inc., 21 FCC Rcd 2795, 2795 n.1 (2006).
61. Safeguarding Americans From a Legal Culture of Fear: Approaches to Limiting
Lawsuit Abuse: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong.
174–75 (2004) [hereinafter Lawsuit Abuse Hearing] (newspaper article from
MONITOR DAILY).
62. Id.
63. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3).
64. Levine v. 9 Net Ave., Inc., No. A-1107-00T1, 2001 WL 34013297, at *1 (N.J. App.
Div. June 7, 2001) (citing Int’l Sci. & Tech. Inst. V. Inacom Commc’ns, Inc., 106
F.3d 1146, 1152–53 (4th Cir. 1997)).
65. Levine, 2001 WL 34013297.  In December 2010, the Sixth Circuit, in Charvat v.
Echostar Satellite, LLC, 630 F.3d 459, 463–64 (6th Cir. 2010), disagreed with six
courts of appeals that had concluded that there is no federal question jurisdiction
over private TCPA suits. See Murphey v. Lanier, 204 F.3d 911, 915 (9th Cir.
2000); Foxhall Realty Law Offices, Inc. v. Telecomms. Premium Servs., 156 F.3d
432, 435–37 (2d Cir. 1998); Erienet Inc. v. Velocity Net Inc., 156 F.3d 513, 519 (3d
Cir. 1998); Nicholson v. Hooters of Augusta, Inc. 136 F.3d 1287, 1298 (11th Cir.
1998), modified, 140 F.3d 898 (11th Cir.); Int’l Sci. & Tech. Inst. v. Inacom
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TCPA as the “functional equivalent [of] state law.”66  Consequently,
“although the substantive law giving rise to the private cause of action
is a federally-enacted statute, Congress has rested jurisdiction with
the states.”67  Thus, courts have held that the “TCPA must be treated
as a state statute.”68
Courts have held that the TCPA recognizes “state sovereign power
and authority to reject Congress’ conditional authorization of the pri-
vate right to a cause of action.”69  Despite being given the opportunity
Commc’ns, Inc., 106 F.3d 1146, 1158 (4th Cir. 1997); Chair King, Inc. v. Houston
Cellular Corp., 131 F.3d 507, 514 (5th Cir. 1997).  Presumably to resolve this
newly created circuit split, on June 27, 2011, the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari in Mims v. Arrow Financial Services, LLC, No. 10-12077, 2010 WL 4840430
(11th Cir. Nov. 30, 2010), cert granted, 79 U.S.L.W. 3578 (U.S. June 27, 2011)
(No. 10-1195), which, through dealing with a violation of the TCPA’s anti-
telemarketing provision, concerns the same private right of action provision (47
U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)).  Diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), and jurisdiction
based on the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), in TCPA cases re-
main with federal courts. See, e.g., US Fax Law Ctr., Inc. v. iHire, Inc., 476 F.3d
1112, 1117 (10th Cir. 2007); Gottlieb v. Carnival Corp., 436 F.3d 335, 340–41 (2d
Cir. 2006); Kavu, Inc. v. Omnipak Corp., 246 F.R.D. 642, 646 (W.D. Wash. 2007).
But in another recent development, the Third Circuit granted rehearing en banc
in Landsman & Funk PC v. Skinder-Strauss Associates, 640 F.3d 72, (3d Cir.
2011), reh’g granted, Nos. 09-3105, 09-3793, 2011 WL 1879624 (3d. Cir. May 17,
2011) (en banc), to consider whether the TCPA also strips federal courts of diver-
sity jurisdiction.  This unusual statutory scheme for private enforcement of the
TCPA has led to some equal protection based challenges, arguing that because
some states may not allow for such actions while others do deprives residents of
states prohibiting private enforcement of equal protection. E.g., Foxhall, 156
F.3d at 437–38.
“Essentially because of the nature of this statutory scheme under the
TCPA only the existence of a private right of action based upon federal
question jurisdiction would vary from state to state.  Diversity jurisdic-
tion would still remain as would rights enforceable by a state’s attorney
general of the Federal Communications Commission irrespective of the
above referenced private cause of action availability.”
Weitzner v. Vaccess Am. Inc., 5 Pa. D. & C. 5th 95, 103, 2008 WL 4491534 (2008).
This argument was essentially foreclosed by the Fourth Circuit which held that
any inequities under the TCPA’s legislative classification were not based on a
fundamental right or immutable characteristic, and therefore survived rational
basis scrutiny. Inacom, 106 F.3d 1146, 1156 (4th Cir. 1997).  The court held that
“Congress acted rationally in both closing federal courts and allowing states to
close theirs to the millions of private actions that could be filed if only a small
portion of each year’s 6.75 billion telemarketing transmissions were illegal under
the TCPA.” Id. at 1157.
66. Gottlieb, 436 F.3d at 342.  The court added that “Congress . . . sought to put the
TCPA on the same footing as state law, essentially supplementing state law
where there were perceived jurisdictional gaps.” Id.
67. Holster III v. Gatco Inc., 485 F. Supp. 2d 179, 184 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
68. Bonime v. Avaya Inc., No. 06 CV 1630 (CBA), 2006 WL 3751219, at *4 (E.D.N.Y.
Dec. 20, 2006).
69. Weitzner, 5 Pa. D. & C. 5th at 106.
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to reject private causes of action under the TCPA, no state has done
so.70
3. Congress (Slightly) Amends the TCPA: The Junk Fax
Prevention Act of 2005
Since its enactment in 1991, and despite great changes in telecom-
munications technology,71 the TCPA has undergone only one signifi-
cant statutory revision—the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005
(JFPA).72  The amendment, however, made several important
changes, including codifying the existing business relationship exemp-
tion and altering the definition of “unsolicited advertisement.”73
The FCC’s regulations implementing the JFPA went into effect on
August 1, 2006.74  “The FCC’s JFPA regulations largely track the
Congressional directives of the JFPA.”75  But the FCC required that
all facsimiles, not just unsolicited ones, contain an opt-out notice.76
And though Congress had authorized the FCC to consider an expira-
tion date on an established business relationship, the FCC declined to
do so, relying instead on the opt-out notice provision.77
Though some small business organizations fought for the codifica-
tion of the established business relationship exception,78 as explained
below, its enactment did little to quell litigation against small busi-
nesses for alleged violations of the TCPA.79
III. THE COSTS OF UNSOLICITED FACSIMILE
ADVERTISEMENTS AND THE TCPA
In enacting the TCPA, Congress was obviously most concerned
with the perceived costs of unsolicited facsimile advertising borne by
70. Some states have, however, enacted their own bans on unsolicited facsimile ad-
vertising that, in some instances, provide for additional penalties against fax ad-
vertisers. See infra subsection IV.B.2.
71. See infra section III.A.
72. Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005, Pub L. No. 109-21, 119 Stat. 359 (2005).
73. Jean Noonan & Michael Goodman, Fax, E-Mail, and Telephone: Federal Regula-
tion of Marketing Methods, 62 BUS. LAW. 575, 576–77 (2007) (arguing that Con-
gress amended the TCPA through the JFPA in three main ways: 1) it added a
definition of “established business relationship” that adopted the FCC’s defini-
tion; 2) it revised the definition of “unsolicited advertisement”; and 3) it codified,
in the JFPA, the principle that unsolicited facsimile advertisements could be
transmitted based on an established business relationship, even if the recipient
has not previously provided permission).
74. Rules and Regulations Implementing the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005, 71
Fed. Reg. 42297 (July 26, 2006) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 64).
75. Noonan & Goodman, supra note 73, at 577.
76. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(D) (2006); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(3)(iv) (2006).
77. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(5).
78. See, e.g., Letter from Dan Danner, supra note 3.
79. See infra Part V.
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consumers.80  The recipient of junk mail does not have to pay to re-
ceive it, but the recipient of a junk fax, Congress thought, has to pay
for toner and paper.81  But the costs of unsolicited faxes and the TCPA
are more complex.
A. Facsimile Machine Technology at the Time TCPA was
Enacted and Today
In the early 1990s, when the TCPA was enacted, three-fourths of
facsimile machines in the United States printed faxes on rolls of costly
thermal transfer paper.82  At that time, facsimile machines that could
print faxes on ordinary “copier” paper cost approximately $2,000.83
Only a decade later, the cost of a plain-paper facsimile machine
dropped by almost 95% to around $100—almost completely replacing
the older thermal transfer technology in the process.84  An expert in
the facsimile technology field estimated that when the TCPA was en-
acted, the cost to receive (and print) a facsimile was about ten to fif-
teen cents per page.85  A decade later, technological advances and
competition in the ink, toner, and paper industries, brought the cost
down to about two to three cents per page.86  Today the cost to receive
a fax on a traditional laser facsimile machine is about two cents.87
But traditional facsimile machines—or at least the use of tradi-
tional facsimile machines to receive faxes—have become the excep-
tion, rather than the norm.88  Traditional facsimile machines have
been replaced, in many instances, by computer fax servers that allow
the recipient to view faxes on her computer and decide whether or not
to print the document.89  Thus the recipient of an unsolicited adver-
80. Though the Act’s title implies that it applies only to “consumers,” which is some-
times defined as individuals, see, e.g., Culbreath v. Golding Enters., L.L.C., 872
N.E.2d 284 (Ohio 2007), the anti-junk fax provisions of the TCPA apply equally to
all facsimile machine owners—from individuals to Fortune 500 corporations. See
supra note 6.
81. 151 Cong. Rec. H5,264-04 (daily ed. June 28, 2005) (statement of Rep. Markey).





87. This calculation is based on the cost of paper (about 1/2 cent per sheet)
(samsclub.com: 5,000 sheets at $29.88), the cost of toner for a Brother Intellifax
4100E laser facsimile machine (about 1 cent per page) (Officemax.com: $69.99 for
a cartage that yields about 6,000 pages), and the cost of the printing drum for the
same machine (about 3/4 of a cent) (Officemax.com: $143.99 for a drum that yields
about 20,000 pages).
88. Letter from Maury Kauffman, supra note 21, at 6–7.
89. Id. at 7.  Though small businesses may still rely on a traditional facsimile ma-
chine more often than larger entities, the switch to a fax-server based model is
relatively easy with many online companies offering such services to small busi-
nesses without the need for the business to purchase any special equipment. See,
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tisement that she finds to have no value will simply ignore the docu-
ment without printing it, reducing the actual cost of receiving the fax
to zero—just like receiving an unwanted e-mail or a piece of tradi-
tional mail.90
The use of computerized facsimile servers has led to the advent of
“fax-to-email” technology, where a facsimile computer server converts
the facsimile to an email attachment that is then forwarded to the
intended recipient.91  This technology, likewise, reduces the real cost
of receiving a facsimile advertisement to practically zero.92  Further,
individual consumers or small businesses that cannot afford to set up
their own facsimile server can sign up for fax-to-email services on the
internet, some of which provide free facsimile receiving services.93
B. Monetary Costs of Receiving Unsolicited Facsimiles
What is the true cost to a business or individual who received an
unsolicited advertisement on their facsimile machine?  The answer is
rarely discussed in TCPA related court decisions,94 and has changed
dramatically with advances and changes in technology.95  It is beyond
dispute that the pecuniary cost of receiving an unsolicited facsimile
has always been minimal, and is now practically zero.96
e.g., FAXCOMPARE.COM (March 2011), http://www.faxcompare.com (providing an
“apples to apples” comparison of six online facsimile service providers and re-
views of other similar service providers).
90. Any annoyance factor is negligible, and further discussed in subsection III.C.1.
91. See, e.g., WINDOWS NT FAX SOLUTIONS, http://www.ntfaxfaq.com (last visited Feb.
18, 2011).
92. See, e.g., Open Text Right Fax, OPEN TEXT, http://faxsolutions.opentext.com/fax-
server.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2011); see also infra section III.C (discussing the
intangible costs associated with receiving an unsolicited facsimile
advertisement).
93. See, e.g., K7.NET: UNIFIED MESSAGING, http://www.k7.net (last visited Feb. 20,
2011).
94. Actual damages are rarely considered by courts because the vast majority of
plaintiffs seek statutory damages of $500–$1,500 per facsimile. See supra sub-
section II.C.2.b; infra note 98.
95. Even at the time the TCPA was enacted, the “drafters recognized that damages
from a single violation would ordinarily amount to a few pennies worth of ink and
paper usage.”  Levine v. 9 Net Ave., Inc., No. A-1107-00T1, 2001 WL 34013297, at
*1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 7, 2001) (citing 137 CONG. REC. S16204,
S16205–06 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hollings)); see also section
III.A (comparing the cost of facsimile technology at the time the TCPA was en-
acted to the cost of the technology today).
96. See Texas v. Am. Blastfax, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 892, 900 (W.D. Tex. 2003)
(“[D]efendants presented evidence from their expert that the average cost of re-
ceiving an unwanted fax is seven cents per page.”); David E. Sorkin, Unsolicited
Commercial E-mail and the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 45 BUFF.
L. REV. 1001, 1009 (1997) (citing a 1996 survey which found that “modern” fax
machines printed pages at a cost of four to twelve cents each); see also section
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When the TCPA was enacted, the financial costs borne by the re-
cipient of an unsolicited facsimile advertisement included the follow-
ing: (1) the cost of the paper used to print the fax, (2) the cost of the
ink or toner used to print the fax, (3) extra electricity used by the fax
machine in receiving the fax, and (4) the additional wear-and-tear on
the fax machine.97  One of the earliest cases to address and hear evi-
dence on the issue of actual damages was Missouri ex rel. Nixon v.
American Blast Fax, Inc.98
In Nixon, the court heard testimony from an employee of a fax ma-
chine seller who “estimated that it would cost someone between 6 1/2
and 17 cents to receive a faxed advertisement depending on the type of
facsimile machine.”99  But on cross the witness admitted that his esti-
mates were based on retail prices, which few businesses, large and
small, pay.100  The witness also admitted that his estimate assumed
that a fax advertisement used four times as much toner as a “Slerexe”
letter101 and was “just that, an estimate.”102  Another witness, an in-
III.A (comparing the cost of a facsimile technology at the time the TCPA was
enacted to the cost of the technology today).
97. See generally Joseph R. Compoli, Jr., Junk Faxes: Combining Causes of Action
Under Federal and State Law, 2 AM. ASS’N JUST. 1829 (2007) (“Junk faxes are
more than merely irritating.  It represents an unfair shifting of the cost of adver-
tising from the advertiser to the unwitting recipients who bear the expense of
wasted paper, toner ink and electricity.”); Sorkin, supra note 96, at 1009 (“The
recipient also bears the cost of wear and tear on the receiving fax machine, as
well as administrative costs incurred in logging and routing incoming faxes and
replenishing paper and ink supplies.”).
98. 196 F. Supp. 2d 920 (E.D. Mo. 2002), rev’d, 323 F.3d 649 (8th Cir. 2003).  Few
cases address actual damages because they are almost never demanded as the
statutory damages provided for in the TCPA exceed by many orders of magnitude
any actual damages the average fax recipient may incur. See, e.g., Sedowski v.
Med1 Online, LLC, No. 07-C-2973, 2008 WL 489360, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 20,
2008) (holding that provision in TCPA providing for $500 statutory damages does
not violate due process even though defendants claimed it was “approximately
2500 times the actual damage”); Italia Foods, Inc v. Marinov Enters., Inc. No. 07-
C-2494, 2007 WL 4117626, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 2007) (finding no due process
violation for imposing $1,500 fine per violation, even though this was approxi-
mately 30,000 times the actual harm suffered).
99. Nixon, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 923.
100. Id. at 923–24.
101. A Slerexe Letter is a facsimile industry test document in which approximately
four percent of the page is covered in ink that is often used to determine facsimile
machine supply yields, transmission speed, and memory capacity. See Denine
Phillips, Demystifying Fax Terminology: Understanding How a Vendor Computes
Operating Costs and Machine Speeds will Help Ensure that Your Next Fax
Purchase is a Good Buy, OFF. SYS’S MAG. (June 1995), http://www.tech-write.biz/
docs/tw_a20.pdf; Denine Phillips, Slerex Letter Sets Benchmarks: This Industry
Test Document Determines Supply Yields, Transmits Speed and Memory Capac-
ity, BUS. TECH. AND SOLUTIONS MAG. (April 1995), http://www.tech-write.biz/docs/
tw_a18.pdf.
102. Nixon, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 923 n.5.
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surance agent who runs a small office, testified that “the faxes tie up
his phone lines for phone calls and other faxes, and that the faxes cost
him money for tangible items such as paper and ink cartridges, as well
as the time his staff has to spend retrieving these faxes from the fax
machine.”103  But this witness’s testimony did not hold up well
either.104
A facsimile industry consultant also testified for the defense in
Nixon.105  The consultant testified that in 2002, the cost to receive a
normal facsimile was about two to three cents, not the much higher
amount estimated by the plaintiff, whose estimate was based on
“dealer list prices” that almost no one pays.106  According to the wit-
ness’ analysis, the cost to a business for “ ‘receipt of a telemarketing
call is higher by a magnitude’ than the receipt of a fax.”107  In addi-
tion, and to the likely surprise and dismay of the TCPA’s supporters,
the consultant “testified to all the advantages of fax advertising for
both the business advertising and the consumers receiving the
faxes.”108  As with other forms of advertising, one of the benefits con-
ferred to the recipient is knowledge of a new product or discount.  This
benefit is likely overlooked by recipients of unsolicited facsimiles be-
cause the annoyance of receiving “useless” faxes colors the recipient’s
view of all fax advertisements.
C. Non-Monetary Costs of Receiving Unsolicited Facsimiles
In addition to the out-of-pocket costs of toner and paper, there is
little doubt that receiving an unsolicited facsimile advertisement car-
ries intangible costs like annoyance and potential deceit.
1. Annoyance Factor
Our lives are full of everyday, trivial, annoyances.109  But few an-
noyances are worthy of government regulation—especially when the
103. Id. at 924.
104. On the insurance agent’s testimony, the court noted:
[He] did not even estimate how much these unsolicited faxes cost his
business per month or even per year.  He also did not testify that he had
received complaints from his customers of how they could not reach him
by phone or fax because the lines were busy, nor did he give an example
of a job he was unable to successfully complete because of the sending an
unsolicited fax.
Id.
105. Id. at 926–27.
106. Id. at 926.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 927.
109. One court commented that the “receipt of an unwarranted fax is a trivial annoy-
ance.  Most individuals just ‘toss’ the document.”  Freedman v. Advanced Wire-
less Cellular Commc’ns, No. SOM-L-611-02, 2005 WL 2122304, at *3 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. June 24, 2005).
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elimination of the annoyance comes at a significant cost to other socie-
tal interests.  Technological advances since the enactment of the
TCPA in 1991 have rendered the receipt of unsolicited facsimile adver-
tising no more than an annoyance.110  Few businesses still use tradi-
tional fax machines that automatically print each facsimile the
business receives.111  Such businesses need spend only seconds toss-
ing an unwanted fax from an innocent lawbreaker into the recycling
bin—the same time it takes to throw away a piece of junk mail.112
And most businesses that receive faxes through a computer server can
simply click the delete button as they do with unwanted e-mail.  The
minor inconvenience caused to the recipient by innocent lawbreakers
sending unsolicited facsimiles should not be compensable to the point
of placing these small businesses into insolvency.  The inconvenience
and business disruption suffered by innocent lawbreakers who have
not run afoul of the TCPA but still have to defend against patently
frivolous TCPA litigation is far greater.113
One may ask, from the point of view of the annoyed recipient of any
unsolicited fax, why it should matter if the fax came from an innocent
lawbreaker or blast-faxer?  Though the minor annoyance of having to
toss out (or delete) an unwanted fax may feel the same, the difference
is that the innocent lawbreaker did not intend to annoy, where the
fax-blaster knows that its transmissions are largely unwelcome.  It is
rarely difficult to discern an advertisement from an innocent law-
breaker, usually a local small business known to the recipient, from a
blast fax.  Any annoyance felt by a recipient of a truthful advertise-
ment from a local business should be even further discounted, espe-
cially since the information contained in the fax may be of value to the
recipient.114
2. Potentially Deceptive or Highly Valuable Content
Just as with many other forms of marketing or advertising,
messages transmitted by facsimile may be truthful115, deceptive116, or
110. See supra section III.A.
111. See supra section III.A.
112. As discussed in subsection VI.B.1, professional fax blasters are excluded from my
definition of innocent lawbreakers.  These businesses that make their living by
sending huge quantities of, often deceptive or fraudulent, advertisements by fax
have been dealt with through State and Federal enforcement actions.
113. See infra Part V.
114. See infra subsection III.C.2.
115. Truthful facsimile advertisements market actual goods or services and are usu-
ally beneficial to the consumer because they may notify the consumer of a sale or
promotion on a product or service the consumer is likely to want.  See, for exam-
ple, advertisements for daily food discounts offered by a neighborhood family-
owned pizza restaurant, Compoli v. Cumby, Inc., No. CV-01-437886 (Ohio Ct.
Com. Pl., Cuyahoga Cnty. last disposition Mar. 13, 2003), and a letter from a
college to fellow members of the local chamber of commerce looking to place grad-
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fraudulent117.  The TCPA, however, makes no distinction between
honest and dishonest unsolicited facsimile advertisements—subject-
ing senders to the same penalties regardless of content.  The transmit-
ters of fraudulent advertisements are, by definition, crooks who have
little interest in obeying fraud laws, let alone the TCPA.  They are,
therefore, difficult to stop using the TCPA’s private enforcement
mechanism.118  Senders of fraudulent or deceptive facsimiles are not
innocent lawbreakers.
The senders of truthful facsimile advertisements, and in particular
the innocent lawbreakers with whom this Article deals, are in many
instances providing a benefit to the consumer who receives their fac-
simile.  Telecommunications consultant Maury Kauffman, in his 2002
comments to the FCC, gives a number of examples, based on real-
world events, of facsimile transmissions that are beneficial but argua-
bly violate the TCPA.119  Some of these examples include the follow-
ing: information from the Food and Drug Administration about a
newly approved drug dosage that is transmitted by the drug’s manu-
facturer to physicians; a recall notice sent by a baby products manu-
facturer to various retailers that also suggests a substitute product
made by the manufacturer; and information about a software upgrade
directed to a now-retired college-professor who had purchased a previ-
ous version, but received by the new professor who replaced her.120
Answering the question of whether any of the above examples vio-
late the TCPA is quite costly—especially to small businesses.121  Con-
gress’s failure to distinguish between the variety of potentially
uates in internships and offering training opportunities to the members’ current
employees, Omerza v. Bryant & Stratton College, Inc., No 05 CV 001237 (Ohio
Ct. Com. Pl., Lake Cnty. filed May 24, 2005). See infra subsection V.D.4.a.
116. Deceptive unsolicited advertisements may offer an actual product or service, but
fail to disclose all of the costs or the true nature of the offer.  For example, a
notification by facsimile that the recipient has been selected for the claimed
honor of inclusion in a “Who’s Who” publication, but failing to disclose that no
actual selection criteria exists (other than a working telephone facsimile number)
and that the true goal of the Who’s Who company is to sell very expensive copies
of the publication and assorted plaques and certificates. See James F. McGrath,
Presidential Who’s Who Scam, EXPLORING OUR MATRIX (Jan. 12, 2010, 12:34 PM),
http://exploringourmatrix.blogspot.com/2010/01/presidential-whos-who-
scam.html.
117. Fraudulent unsolicited facsimiles are not intended to offer a real product or ser-
vice, but are sent with the intent to steal the recipient’s identity or money.  Ex-
amples include “phishing” scams that try to obtain the recipient’s personal and
financial information, offers for non-existent services such as debt relief or fore-
closure avoidance, and supposed surveys that the recipient is asked to return by
facsimile to a 1-900 number, incurring a charge for the transmission.
118. See infra section V.C.
119. Letter from Maury Kauffman, supra note 21.
120. Id. at 3–5.
121. For a more comprehensive discussion, see infra section V.D.
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unsolicited advertisements that can be transmitted by facsimile in en-
acting the TCPA or the JFPA does little to stop fraud and deceit, but
has a significant detrimental impact on innocent lawbreakers.
IV. THE TCPA’S CURRENT RELEVANCE AND UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES
Some may argue that the changes in technology and communica-
tion preferences make the TCPA and TCPA litigation obsolete.  But
the data discussed below and the cottage industry of TCPA plaintiffs’
lawyers demonstrate that these cases continue to be filed against in-
nocent lawbreakers.122  It is precisely because of a decrease in facsim-
ile usage and shuttering of the major blast faxers that the TCPA
cottage industry lawyers are increasingly left with only innocent law-
breakers to target, sometimes in class action lawsuits.123
Industry expert Maury Kauffman, in commenting on the FCC’s
proposed regulations implementing the TCPA, concludes that Con-
gress never really considered the effect class actions could have on the
TCPA’s statutory damages provision.124
A. Empirical Analysis of Recent TCPA Litigation
Despite the advances in technology described above that arguably
render the harsh penalties for transmitting unsolicited facsimiles un-
necessary, TCPA litigation continues.125  As explained above, private
enforcement actions may be brought in any state court of general ju-
risdiction, and in some cases, even in Federal Courts.126  With ninety-
four Federal District Courts127 and approximately 13,500 state courts,
it is difficult to quantify the total number of private TCPA enforce-
ment cases that have been brought in American courts since the
TCPA’s enactment.  And cases filed in “small claims” type courts,
122. See generally Letter from Maury Kauffman, supra note 21, at 7 (“Technology, the
market and most importantly, consumers, have spoken and fax is the loser.  Un-
solicited facsimile advertisements are no longer the great threat they were feared
to be in 1990–1992.  Perhaps the best evidence of this fact, is the massive con-
sumer outcry against unsolicited commercial email (UCE) or spam, versus the
relative whimper regarding unsolicited (or junk) fax.”).
123. See, e.g., infra subsection V.D.4.b.
124. Letter from Maury Kauffman, supra note 21, at 9.  Kauffman also notes that
“[f]rivolous suits have been brought in numerous states and jurisdictions across
the country.  Suing small business owners for millions of dollars because some
consumers may have received one unsolicited advertisement is certainly NOT
within the spirit of the law’s Enforcement paragraphs.” Id.
125. See, e.g., Brodsky v. HumanaDental Ins. Co., No. 10-C-3233, 2011 WL 529302
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 2011).
126. See supra subsection II.C.2.
127. Federal Judges: Frequently Asked Questions, UNITED STATES COURTS, www.us
courts.gov/faq.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2011).
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which are often divisions within other state courts, are almost impos-
sible to track.128  Though an exact figure is practically impossible to
determine, a representative sample of TCPA cases can be gleaned
from private services such as the Courthouse News Service
(“CNS”).129
Beginning in 2003, CNS has catalogued all new case filings in vari-
ous major Federal and State jurisdictions.130  The analysis of availa-
ble CNS data between March 27, 2003 and June 5, 2008,131 reveals
that there were 1,744 new cases132 filed by or on behalf of private indi-
viduals or businesses133 involving an alleged violation of the TCPA.
One thousand, three hundred ninety-five of these cases (80%) involved
alleged violations of the anti junk-fax provision, and 158 (9%) involved
telemarketing calls.134  Only a handful of these cases, about 4%, were
brought by pro-se litigants.135  Six hundred fifty-five of the fax cases
were brought on behalf of or by individuals136 and 740 were brought
on behalf of companies; 134 of the telemarketing cases were brought
by or on behalf of individuals and 24 were brought on behalf of busi-
nesses.137  In 28% of the cases, the complaint demanded class certifi-
128. Since the monetary jurisdiction of small claims courts is relatively low, ranging
from $1,500 in Kentucky to $15,000 in Georgia, such actions are of less concern.
Indeed, if TCPA claims were limited to small claims court enforcement, much of
the unfairness to innocent lawbreakers identified in this Article would be elimi-
nated. See infra sections VII.D–E.
129. The CNS employs reporters who physically review all new case filings on a daily
or weekly basis, depending on jurisdiction, and sends out reports via e-mail to
subscribers. See COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE, www.courthouse news.com (last
updated Feb. 19, 2011).  Subscribers use the reports to monitor case filings in
their jurisdiction for marketing purposes, or to identify new litigation filed
against the subscribers’ current clients or clients the subscribers seek to re-
present. Id.
130. See About Us, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE, http://www.courthousenews.com/
aboutus.html (last updated Nov. 14, 2008).
131. The CNS data included 104 state and federal trial courts. See infra chart of the
CNS records, Appendix A.
132. Some of the filings in federal courts were removals of state court actions.  The
author has attempted to make sure that there are no duplicative figures.
133. The data also revealed eight cases brought by or on behalf of the public by, in
almost every instance, a state Attorney General. See infra chart of the CNS
records, Appendix A.
134. One hundred eighty-two (10%) of the cases could not be categorized as fax or
telemarketing violations because of the limitations in the data set.
135. Twenty-two cases involving alleged fax violations and forty-two involving alleged
telemarketing violations were brought without the aid of counsel. See COURT-
HOUSE NEWS SERVICE, supra note 130.  Six additional cases brought by pro-se
litigants could not be categorized based on the available data set. See id.
136. This estimate is likely significantly higher than reality.  This is because in many
instances, cases are brought in the name of individuals even though the cause of
action belongs to a business entity. See infra subsection VII.B.1.
137. One hundred thirteen of the unclassified cases were individuals and sixty-nine
were businesses. See COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE, supra note 130.
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cation.138  Interestingly, about one-third of the cases were filed by the
same attorney.139
B. Enforcement of the TCPA—Blast Faxers
As discussed above, the anti-junk fax provisions of the TCPA have
three enforcement mechanisms: (1) lawsuits by states brought in fed-
eral court seeking damages and injunctive relief;140 (2) enforcement
action brought by the FCC seeking administrative civil penalties;141
and (3) private lawsuits brought by individuals in state court.142
1. Shutting Down the Major Blast Faxers
As the number of facsimile machines used by businesses grew to
almost ubiquity, marketing companies sought to take advantage of
this new medium to send advertising messages to potential customers
at a relatively low cost.  This led to the formation of a number of blast
faxers—that is, businesses that combined computer faxing technology
with databases of millions of telephone facsimile numbers to send fax
advertisement on behalf of clients.  The most notorious of these com-
panies, Fax.com, boasted of sending up to two million faxes per day.143
This industry, however, was not long lived.  Largely because of the
TCPA, by 2004, Fax.com was effectively out of business—choosing not
to even defend itself in TCPA litigation.144  Fax.com’s demise can be
traced, in large part, to an enforcement action brought by the States of
138. Class certification was demanded in 453 of the fax cases (about 33%) but only in 8
telemarketing cases (5%). Id.  Twenty-nine cases that demanded class certifica-
tion could not be categorized from the available data. Id.
139. Five hundred seventy-eight of the cases identified in the CNS data involved the
same attorney as either the lawyer or litigant. Id.
140. 47 U.S.C. § 227(f)(1)–(2).
141. Id. § 503(b)(1).
142. Id. § 227(b)(3).
143. Covington & Burling v. Int’l Mktg. & Research, Inc., No. CIV.A. 01-0004360, 2003
WL 21384825, at *1 (D.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 17, 2004).  Fax.com also advertised on
its web-site that it “had a database that ‘exceeds 30 million fax numbers.” Id. at
*3.
144. See Freedman v. Advanced Wireless Cellular Commc’ns, No. SOM-L-611-02,
2005 WL 2122304 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June 24, 2005). Freedman described
an award by default judgment of $20,000,000 plus attorneys fees in a class action
case against, primarily, Fax.com. Id. at *1. This award was vacated on a motion
by a co-defendant after it demonstrated, among other defenses, excusable neglect
in failing to defend. Id. at *4. Fax.com apparently never entered an appearance
in the case.
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California and Indiana.145  In addition, in 2002, the FCC fined
Fax.com $5.3 million for TCPA violations.146
In another more recent case, the FCC fined First Choice Health-
care $776,500 after finding that First Choice transmitted “at least 98
unsolicited advertisements to the telephone facsimile machines of at
least 37 consumers.”147  The FCC is authorized to fine a violator up to
$16,000 for each unsolicited facsimile advertisement,148 but it has dis-
cretion to determine what it believes to be a proper penalty based on
the specific facts of each case and the findings of its investigation.149
Furthermore, the FCC’s enforcement action against (any remain-
ing) major violators of the TCPA may increase in light of the General
Accountability Office’s April 5, 2006 report that concluded the FCC
needed to improve its efforts at enforcing the TCPA.150
Though it was ultimately action by the FCC and state attorneys
general that shut down the major blast faxes like Fax.com, there were
private enforcement suits filed for Fax.com’s blatant violations of the
Act.151  In addition to Fax.com, junkfax.org has compiled a list of
145. See California & Indiana v. Fax.com, No. 03-CV-1438 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2004)
(order granting preliminary injunction); Ryan Singel, Curtain Call for Junk-Fax
Blaster, WIRED MAG. (Oct. 9, 2004), http://www.wired.com/techbiz/media/news/
2004/10/65291.
146. In re Fax.com, Inc., 17 FCC Rcd 15927, 15927 (2002); see also Brooke M. Carey,
Fax Blasting at the OK Corral: Is the FCC Shooting from the Hip?, 18 LOY. CON-
SUMER L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2005–2006) (discussing lawsuits filed against Fax.com by
recipients of unsolicited faxes).
147. In re First Choice Healthcare, Inc., 21 FCC Rcd 2795, 2795 (2006) The FCC’s
proposed fine included $4,500 for each facsimile sent to a consumer before that
consumer requested that First Choice Healthcare stop sending the faxes, and
$11,000 for each facsimile send after the request. Id. at 2798–2799.
148. 47 C.F.R. § 1.80(b)(3) (2008).  Title 47 of the United States Code, Section
503(b)(2)(D), provides a base forfeiture amount of up to $10,000, which must be
adjusted for inflation under the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321.  The most recent amendment to 47 C.F.R. section
1.80(b)(3) sets the amount at $16,000.
149. “In exercising such authority, we are to take into account ‘the nature, circum-
stances, extent, and gravity of the violation and, with respect to the violator, the
degree of culpability, any history of prior offenses, ability to pay, and such other
matters as justice may require.’”  First Choice Healthcare, 21 FCC Rcd at 2798
(citing 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(2)(D)); see In re Commission’s Forfeiture Policy State-
ment and Amendment of Section 1.80 of the Rules to Incorporate the Forfeiture
Guidelines, 12 FCC Rcd. 17087, 17100–17101 (1997).
150. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-425, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEES, TELECOMMUNICATIONS: WEAKNESSES IN PROCEDURES AND PERFORM-
ANCE MANAGEMENT HINDER JUNK FAX ENFORCEMENT (2006), available at http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/d06425.pdf; see Noonan & Goodman, supra note 73, at
578.
151. See, e.g., Covington & Burling v. Int’l Mktg. & Research, Inc., No. CIV.A. 01-
0004360, 2003 WL 21384825, at *5 (D.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 17, 2003) (finding that
Fax.com sent 1,634 unsolicited advertisement on behalf of three clients to plain-
tiff in one week, 1,471 of which were sent after the plaintiff had contacted
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other major fax broadcasters who operated in an almost blatant disre-
gard of the TCPA.152
2. State Regulations of Unsolicited Facsimiles
Some states have enacted their own laws to prohibit the transmis-
sion of unsolicited facsimiles.153  But few impose restrictions more
stringent than the TCPA.  One state, not surprisingly California, has
attempted to eliminate the established business relationship excep-
tion that is codified in the TCPA.154  But a California federal district
court held that this provision could not apply to interstate facsimile
transmissions because such interstate regulation is preempted by the
TCPA.155
V. THE TCPA AND INNOCENT LAWBREAKERS
Before discussing the TCPA’s impact on innocent lawbreakers, it is
important to discuss the “cottage industry”156 of TCPA plaintiff’s law-
yers that has developed and flourished in response to the TCPA’s gen-
erous statutory penalties.  It is because of this cottage industry that
innocent lawbreakers have much to fear from inadvertent violations of
the Act.
A. TCPA Cottage Industry157
Unlike state attorneys general and the FCC, plaintiffs’ lawyers
who pursue TCPA claims do not necessarily have in mind the best
Fax.com to demand that the faxes stop); Carey, supra note 147, at 3–4; Amkraut
v. PCOP, THE LAW OFFICES OF JAMIE R. SCHLOSS, http://jrschlosslaw.org/am-
kraut/amkrautupdateA.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2011) (describing the October
16, 2006 California superior court case, which awarded a $235 million judgment
against Fax.com); Michael Singer, Fax.com Sued for $2.2 Trillion, IN-
TERNETNEWS.COM (Aug. 23, 2002), http://www.internetnews.com/bus-news/arti-
cle.php/1451781/Faxcom-Sued-for-22-Trillion.htm.
152. Junk Fax Profiles, JUNKFAX.ORG, http://www.junkfax.org/fax/profiles/index.htm
(last visited Feb. 21, 2011).
153. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1482 (Supp. 2009); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 6-1-702 (West 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.395 (West 2004); N.Y. GEN. BUS.
LAW § 396-aa (McKinney Supp. 2007).
154. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17538.43 (West 2008).
155. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Lockyer, No. 2:05-CV-2257MCEKJM, 2006
WL 462482, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2006).
156. Omerza v. Bryant & Stratton Coll., 2007-Ohio-5215, at ¶20 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007),
available at http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/11/2007/2007-Ohio-
5215.pdf (“Although the receipt of one ‘unsolicited advertisement’ may violate the
TCPA, . . . what Congress did not intend as a result of the passage of the TCPA
was the creation of a cottage industry for litigation.  Nevertheless, this is pre-
cisely what has transpired.”).
157. The term “cottage industry” to refer to plaintiffs’ lawyers who bring TCPA claims
has been used by both commentators and courts. See Brandee L. Caswell,
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interest of the general public.  Their duties are only to their clients (or,
in some instances, themselves).158  The TCPA cottage industry got a
major boost with a headline grabbing victory against a Hooters res-
taurant franchise in Georgia, where a court ordered the restaurant to
pay nearly $12 million in damages for TCPA violations.159
In 1995, Hooters of Augusta (Hooters) purchased fax advertising
space on flyers sent out to a databank of local Georgia businesses.160
A local Augusta attorney received one of the faxes and sued in state
court under the TCPA.161  Not satisfied with seeking compensation for
his own damages, the plaintiff in this case sought class certification—
which the court granted.162
Then, in early 2001, a jury found that Hooters had willfully and
knowingly violated the TCPA by sending six facsimile advertise-
ments.163  Unfortunately for Hooters, these six ads went to a class of
1,321 businesses and individuals.164  And, because the jury found that
the faxes were sent willfully, the judge trebled the damages award,
entering a judgment against Hooters of $11,889,000.165  TCPA plain-
tiffs’ lawyers have touted this sensational decision in many of the
threatening letters they send to innocent lawbreakers,166 trying, pre-
sumably, to scare them into a quick settlement.
Many TCPA cases brought by lawyers are not brought on behalf of
clients, but on behalf of the lawyer himself (or his law firm).167  For
instance, Consumer Crusade, Inc. and U.S. Fax Law Center, Inc.
Regulating Faxing Activity Under State and Federal Law, 34 COLO. LAW. 63, 67
(2005) (“The private right of action and statutory damage provisions of the TCPA
have spawned an industry of junk fax litigation.”); Carey, supra note 147, at 39
(“It seems that although Congress and the FCC were not necessarily panning for
gold when they passed the TCPA, plaintiffs may have a different agenda.”).
158. Whether many of these lawyers represent “real” clients or only nominal clients is
not clear. See infra subsection VII.B.1.
159. Nicholson v. Hooters of Augusta, Inc., No. 95-RCCV-616 (Ga. Sup. Ct. Apr. 25,
2001), available at http://www.keytlaw.com/faxes/hooterscase.htm.
160. Id.
161. Id.; Faxed Ads Cost Hooters $12 Million, GOOD MORNING AMERICA ONLINE (July
25, 2005), http://www.abcnews.go.com/GMA/story?id=126819&page=1.
162. Nicholson, No. 95-RCCV-616 (Ga. Sup. Ct. Aug. 26, 1998) (order certifying case




166. Letter from Joseph Compoli, Jr., Attorney at Law, to Custom Tool & Gage, Inc.
(Mar. 11, 2004) (“Recently, in the case of Nicholson v. Hooters of Augusta, a court
in Georgia awarded over $11.8 million in a class action lawsuit under the
TCPA.”), as reprinted in Lawsuit Abuse Hearing, supra note 61 (statement of
Karen R. Harned, Esq., Exec. Dir., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. Legal Found.).
167. See, e.g., Law Offices of Michael A. Freedman v. Advanced Wireless Cellular
Commc’ns, Inc., No. SOM-L-611-02, 2005 WL 2122304 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
June 24, 2005); Covington & Burling v. Int’l Mktg. & Research, Inc., No. CIV.A.
01-0004360, 2003 WL 21384825 (D.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 17, 2003); Compoli v.
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would pay junk fax recipients a small fee (usually around $25) for
their junk faxes, have the claims assigned to them, and then seek stat-
utory damages of $1,500 per fax from the sender.168  Some faxers have
gone as far as accusing these attorneys of running “legal shakedown
schemes.”169  In another case, the frustrated president of a small
Michigan company that specialized in medical equipment leasing that
was sued in Ohio, commented, “[w]e make every attempt to conform to
the law in all aspects of our business, and face the possibility of severe
financial penalties for unintentionally causing miniscule damage—
about $0.03 in resources.  I’m sure the people of Cuyahoga County
[Ohio] want their courts to have time to concentrate on important
problems . . . not have them used to line lawyer’s pockets.”170
These descriptions are not entirely without foundation.  For exam-
ple, a 2006 article in the Wall Street Journal quotes one Chicago attor-
ney as saying: “Why not turn all those junk faxes into a college fund
for your kids?”171  The same article also referenced an Arizona web-
site, which encouraged visitors to “[t]urn [their] fax machine into a
money machine.”172  The article at one point goes on to liken these
attorneys to “bounty hunters,” and notes that if Osama Bin Laden had
sent 100,000 junk faxes, there would be a larger price on his head
than the $25 million reward the government was offering.173
1. Support Infrastructure
Cottage industry lawyers use both public and private web sites to
share information and strategies, as well as solicit new clients.174
Many of these websites offer step-by-step guides and printable legal
forms for potential plaintiffs to bring suit.175
Additionally, several websites act as “support networks” for junk
fax industry lawyers, helping them recruit clients and share informa-
tion.176  Junkfax.org, for example, has several links off of their
Cumby, Inc., No. CV-01-437886 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl., Cuyahoga Cnty. last disposi-
tion Mar. 13, 2003).
168. Paula Moore, Appeals Court Calls a Halt To Aspect of Junk Fax Suits, DENVER
BUS. J. (Feb. 16, 2007), http://denver.bizjournals.com/denver/stories/2007/02/19/
story8.html?t=printable.
169. Seth Lubove, Fax and Friction, FORBES.COM (Jan. 1, 2004), http://
www.forbes.com/2004/01/20/cz_sl_0120 faxes_print.html.
170. Lawsuit Abuse Hearing, supra note 61, at 174–75.




174. See, e.g., Attorney Information, JUNKFAX.ORG, http://www.junkfax.org/fax/ba-
sic_info/attorneys.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2011) (lists dozens of attorneys in al-
most every state who handle TCPA litigation).
175. Lubove, supra note 169.
176. E.g., JUNKFAX.ORG, http://www.junkfax.org (last visited Feb. 21, 2011).
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homepage for consumers about junk fax “horror stories,”177 and “how
to get even.”178  For those consumers who don’t want to “do it your-
self,” there’s the handy attorney reference page, which lists several
experienced law firms and lawyers who have successfully prosecuted
junk faxers in the past.179
Then there is the so-called TCPA reporter.  Self-described as the
“most important and comprehensive research resource for TCPA liti-
gation,”180 this website contains links and information about the stat-
ute and the federal regulations implementing it, as well as databanks
of cases and briefs about TCPA litigation.
“If your task is busting some illegal telemarketers, then there are
many tools that can help,”181 or so says TCPAtools.com.  This site con-
tains links to several “wiki’s” that help attorneys and consumers iden-
tify and track down junk fax senders and other TCPA violators.182
Even local, state, and national bar associations have joined the
fray, creating special chapters or subgroups dedicated to TCPA litiga-
tion.183  The American Association of Justice184 lists a “Telemarket-
ing, Spam, or Junk Fax” litigation group.185  All of this evidences the
pervasiveness of TCPA and junk fax litigation, and the extent to
which this cottage industry has blossomed into a national cash cow for
plaintiff’s attorneys specializing in TCPA disputes.
B. Innocent Lawbreakers
How can a lawbreaker be innocent?  By innocent lawbreaker, I
mean a person—or most often a small business—that unknowingly or
177. Junk Fax Real Life Stories, JUNKFAX.ORG, www.junkfax.org/fax/stories/in-
dex.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2011).
178. How to Get Them to Stop And/Or Get Even, JUNKFAX.ORG, www.junkfax.org/fax/
action/getEven.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2011).
179. Attorney Information, JUNKFAX.ORG, www.junkfax.org/fax/reference/index.htm
(last visited Feb. 21, 2011).
180. TCPALAW.COM, www.tcpalaw.com (last visited Feb. 21, 2011).
181. TCPATOOLS.COM, http://www.tcpatools.com (last visited Feb. 21, 2011).
182. Id.  The links include the following: “User Guides,” a “Caller ID Database,” a
“Complaint Generator” (for the industrious consumer), and even a “Perp
Database,” identifying all known “perpetrators” of the TCPA. Id.
183. See James Nash, Junk Fax Senders Win a Victory in Ohio Courts, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH (Sept. 6, 2007) http://www.dispatch.com/live/content/business/stories/
2007/09/06/JUNKFAX.ART_ART_09-06-07_C12_U97QQA8.html (quoting an at-
torney from the “Telephone Consumer Rights Bar Association of Ohio”).
184. “For 65 years, the American Association of Justice, also known as the Association
of Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA), has supported plaintiff trial lawyers—as the
collective voice of the trial bar on Capital Hill and in courthouses across the na-
tion and by providing exclusive services designed for trial lawyers.” AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION FOR JUSTICE (2011), http://www.justice.org/cps/rde/xchg/justice/
hs.xsl/default.htm.
185. Litigation Groups, AM. ASS’N FOR JUSTICE, http://www.justice.org/cps/rde/xchg/
justice/hs.xsl/1150.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2011).
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unwittingly violates some (often obscure or technical) law or regula-
tion.  The lawbreaker is “innocent”—as I use the term here—because
he is usually unaware of the law or regulation he is violating or is
aware of the law but unaware that his conduct violates it.186  The in-
nocent lawbreaker does not intend to violate the law or regulation.
And the “victim” of the violation suffers no real injury or damages be-
yond (in some instances) some deminimus cost or inconvenience.  In a
way, it is the innocent lawbreaker who is also the victim of (often well-
intentioned) laws or regulations—a victim of strict-liability laws like
the TCPA that have little or no safeguards to protect inadvertent vio-
lators against potentially ruinous litigation or settlement costs.187
1. What is an Innocent Lawbreaker in Connection with the
TCPA?
The TCPA, as originally enacted in 1991, completely forbade the
transmission of advertisements by facsimile unless the recipient spe-
cifically consented to the transmission.188  The 2005 amendment, the
JFPA, added one significant exception to this general prohibition, cod-
ifying the FCC’s established business relationship (EBR) rule.189  But
even twenty years after its original enactment, many individuals and
small businesses do not know about the TCPA.190
i. Ignorance of the TCPA’s Existence or Misunderstanding of
the TCPA’s Scope and Prohibitions
It is common for small businesses to be solicited by advertising
companies that place an ad in a coupon book, coupon magazine, or a
186. Though the TCPA is a strict liability offense, the point here is that some violators
of a strict liability statute are more morally culpable than others.  This difference
should not be ignored.
187. One may argue that all strict-liability laws create the risk of prosecuting innocent
lawbreakers.  But most strict liability laws differ from the TCPA because the vic-
tims of the regulated conduct suffer real injuries, and having a mens rea require-
ment would make enforcement unfeasible.  As explained in Part III, supra,
unsolicited facsimile recipients do not suffer the type of injury that needs to be
addressed with a strict liability statute.  In fact, the punitive nature of the
TCPA’s statutory damages, see infra section VII.C, as compared to the
deminimus damages suffered by fax recipients argue against strict liability and
in favor of punishing only intentional violations. See supra section IV.B.  Inten-
tional violators of the TCPA are not innocent lawbreakers.
188. See Williams, supra note 33, at 346; see also Michael R. Laudino, To Fax or Not to
Fax: Analysis of the Regulations and Potential Burdens Imposed by the Junk Fax
Prevention Act of 2005, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 835, 840 (2007) (“[T]he TCPA set
out to create a complete ban on unsolicited commercial faxes.”).
189. For a more thorough discussion of the EBR rule, see Laudino, supra note 188;
Williams, supra note 33; Noonan & Goodman, supra note 73, at 576–77.
190. See, e.g., Victoria Lim, Coffee Offer Lands Business In Hot Water, TAMPA TRIB.,
Jan. 23, 2005, Money Sense, at 1.
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similar medium meant to promote local businesses to potential cus-
tomers.191  One such medium promoted to small businesses was the
inclusion of an advertisement in a newsletter sent by facsimile to po-
tential customers.192  Other marketing businesses offer to send fac-
similes advertising daily specials to a small business’ customers.193  It
is safe to assume that the small businesses that sign up for such fac-
simile marketing campaigns do not know that sending such faxes can
be a violation of the TCPA that could subject them to large statutory
damages.  One may think the small business that places the adver-
tisement, but does not actually send the facsimile, is shielded from
liability.  But courts have held that that TCPA “appl[ies] not only to
the actual sender of the unsolicited faxes, but also to the companies
whose products are advertised.”194  Though an innocent lawbreaker
could cross-claim against the marketing company that sent the faxes,
it would still have to pay, at a minimum, legal fees to bring the cross-
claim in addition to paying to defend the underlying suit.  And if the
marketing company is a fly-by-night operation, the innocent law-
breaker would still be left holding all of the liability.
C. Why the Cottage Industry Targets Innocent Lawbreakers
There are a number of reasons that TCPA plaintiffs’ lawyers—the
cottage industry—targets innocent lawbreakers.  But the primary one
is simply that it is much easier and cheaper (in terms of litigation
costs for the plaintiff’s lawyer) to target local small businesses.
First, local businesses are, by definition, easy to find.  Innocent
lawbreakers don’t hide their identity; they display it prominently on
the facsimile.  Unlike senders of deceptive or fraudulent facsimiles,195
innocent lawbreakers’ goal is to attract customers, so concealing the
name and address of the company would be self defeating.  Like many
191. See, e.g., JB DOLLAR STRETCHER MAG., http://www.jbdollar.com (last visited Feb.
21, 2011); VALPAK, http://www.valpak.com (last visited Feb 21, 2011).
192. See, e.g., Kenro, Inc. v. Fax Daily, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1162, 1170 (S.D. Ind. 1997).
193. See, e.g., RFG MARKETING, http://www.rfgmarketing.com (last visited Feb. 21,
2011).
194. Covington & Burling v. Int’l Mktg. & Research, Inc., No. CIV.A. 01-0004360, 2003
WL 21384825, at *7 (Super. Ct. D.C., Civ. Div. Apr. 17, 2003) (“The FCC obvi-
ously construes the term ‘use’ in the TCPA’s prohibitions to include both direct
use, and indirect use by way of an agent. . . . This is wholly reasonable, since
liability could be avoided by using an intermediary, advertisers could use a series
of fly-by-night fax advertising firms to send waves of unsolicited faxes, and be
insulated from liability.  Such a construction would clearly allow avoidance of the
statute, and such a construction is to be avoided.” (quoting Neil Zeid v. The Image
Connection, Inc., No. 01AC-002885-Z-CV (Cir. Ct. Mo., St. Louis Cnty., Oct. 30,
2001))).
195. Senders of deceptive or fraudulent facsimiles earn money through the fraudulent
or deceptive scheme the fax “advertises,” and not through the sale of legitimate
products or services. See supra subsection III.C.2.
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other areas subject to government regulation, only law-abiding indi-
viduals and businesses are subject to the government regulation (or
litigation).  A company wanting to go back into the business of blast
faxing can easily do so by setting up its business outside of the juris-
dictional reach of United States laws.  A blast faxer that operates “off-
shore” can often ignore the TCPA and FCC rules.196
Second, innocent lawbreakers are much more likely to be “collecti-
ble,” that is, have easily locatable resources that can be used to satisfy
a judgment.197  Small businesses rarely hide their assets in anticipa-
tion of litigation as may be done by blast faxers who know that they
are violating the law and will likely be subject to litigation or other
enforcement action.
Third, many of the lawyers who are a part of the cottage industry
are solo practitioners or part of a small law-firm, with limited finan-
cial resources.198  Bringing a case against a local small business en-
tails little more than paying the filing fee at a local court.  Suing well
financed, often out-of-state, corporations is potentially much more
costly.  Witnesses may reside outside of the court’s subpoena jurisdic-
tion, requiring potential travel expenses.  Well-financed blast faxers
will also have the financial resources to fight (in court) the lawsuits,
forcing the plaintiff’s lawyer to devote much more time (and poten-
tially money) to the case.  Small businesses are much more likely to
settle a TCPA case early (even if they believe it is baseless) because of
the potential costs to the business of fighting in court.199  Thus, it is
easy to see why small businesses are a popular target for these cottage
industry trial lawyers.200
196. See, e.g., Cyber Communications, Inc., 5/F Lyton Building 36 Mody Road Tsim
Sha Tsui, Kowloon, Hong Kong.
197. “The plaintiff [a lawyer] has chosen this firm as counsel in four other TCPA cases
brought not as individual claims by an aggrieved owner of a facsimile machine
and telephone line, but as a skilled litigant who has culled through the numerous
invaders of his privacy to select only those who have collectability.”  Bernstein v.
Am. Family Ins. Co., No. 02 CH 6905, 2005 WL 1613776, at *3 (Ill. Cir. Ct. July 6,
2005).
198. Though, as individuals, these lawyers do not appear to be an “industry,” because
these individual lawyers or small firms often share information, strategies, and
legal briefs, taken together they can be said to make up an industry.
199. See infra section V.D.
200. Lawsuit Abuse Hearing, supra note 61, at 11 (statement of Karen R. Harned,
Esq., Exec. Dir., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. Legal Found.) (“Small business is the
target of so many of these frivolous suits because trial lawyers understand that a
small-business owner is more likely than a large corporation to settle a case
rather than litigate.  Small-business owners do not have in-house counsels to in-
form them of their rights, write letters responding to allegations made against
them, or provide legal advice.  They do not have the resources needed to hire an
attorney nor the time to spend away from their business fighting many of these
small claim lawsuits.  And often they do not have the power to decide whether or
not to settle a case—the insurer makes that decision.”).
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Finally, small businesses are the targets of TCPA lawsuits because
there are almost no “big” targets left.  Most of the major blast faxers
have been shuttered.201  Yet lawyers who make much of their living
by bringing TCPA claims still need to make a living.  With “no one”
left to sue, cottage industry lawyers must sue everyone, even if the
case they bring is, at best, marginal.202
D. Effects of TCPA Litigation on Innocent Lawbreakers
The harmful impact of TCPA litigation, or even threatened TCPA
litigation, is felt most significantly by small businesses.  Businesses
that can least afford to employ compliance officers or attorneys.  Busi-
nesses that find themselves facing significant unexpected costs result-
ing from the innocent transmission of an advertisement by facsimile.
Small business owners are responsible for most aspects of the busi-
ness’ operations, from hiring employees to taking out the trash to try-
ing to comply with the various state and federal regulatory mandates
imposed on them.203  Thus for “small-business owners, even the
threat of a lawsuit can mean significant time away from their busi-
ness.  Time that could be better spent growing their enterprise and
employing more people.”204
In testimony before a Congressional committee regarding the costs
of unwarranted litigation, Karen Harned, Executive Director of the
Legal Foundation for the National Federation of Independent Busi-
ness (NFIB), first commented generally about the costs of actual and
threatened litigation to NFIB members.205  With the cost of lawsuits
skyrocketing, it is no wonder many small businesses cower at just the
mere threat of a lawsuit.206  Harned noted that nearly half of small-
business owners were either “very concerned” or “somewhat con-
cerned” about being sued.207  These fears are due mainly to the fre-
quency of suits, in general, or, sometimes, the vulnerability of the
owner’s industry as a whole to lawsuits.208
201. See supra subsection IV.B.1.
202. See, e.g., infra subsection V.D.4.
203. Lawsuit Abuse Hearing, supra note 61, at 10 (statement of Karen R. Harned,
Esq., Exec. Dir., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. Legal Found.).
204. Id.
205. The NFIB, which in 2004 counted 600,000 members from all fifty states, repre-
sents “small employers who typically have about five employees and report gross
sales of $300,000–$500,000 per year. Id. at 9.  NFIB’s average member nets
$40,000–$60,000 annually. Id. at 10.  NFIB members represent an important
segment of the business community—a segment with challenges and opportuni-
ties that distinguish them from publicly traded corporations.” Id.
206. Id. (citing TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, U.S. TORT COSTS: 2003 UPDATE (2003)).
207. Id. (citing NAT’L FED’N OF INDEP. BUS., NFIB NATIONAL SMALL BUSINESS POLL:
LIABILITY (William J. Dennis, Jr. ed., 2002)).
208. Id.
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These fears are not totally unfounded, and the multi-million dollar
verdicts are not the problem209—at least, not when you consider the
fact that many businesses net under $100,000 per year.210  To these
businesses, “nuisance value” is a misnomer  and settlement is not the
end of the matter; their insurance premiums are likely to increase for
the foreseeable future as well.211
The first tool in the plaintiff’s lawyer’s playbook is the demand let-
ter.  This seemingly innocuous one-to-two-page document informs bus-
iness owners that they are currently in violation of some particular
statute.212  The demand letter then spouts off a laundry list of case
law and other legal citations to overwhelm the recipient and give them
a feeling of futility.213  But, at the end, the letter gives them the “op-
portunity” to avoid the whole thing for a “modest,” up-front fee.214
The example of this phenomenon given by the NFIB Legal Founda-
tion Executive Director involves TCPA litigation where a tool manu-
facturer was sued by an employee of one of its regular customers.215
209. Id. at 10–11.
210. Id. at 10.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 12.
213. Id.  For instance, the letter might read something like this:
Kindly be advised that it is a violation of the federal Telephone Con-
sumer Protection Act (TCPA), Title 47, United States Code, Section 227,
to transmit fax advertisements without first obtaining the ‘prior express
invitation or permission’ of the recipient. See 47 U.S.C. 227(a)(4) and
227(b)(1)(C).  In addition, Ohio courts have declared that a violation of
the TCPA is a [sic] ‘unfair or deceptive’ act or practice under the Ohio
Consumer Sales Practices Act (CSPA), Section 1345.02(A) of the Ohio
Revised Code.
Letter from Joseph R. Compoli, Jr., supra note 166.
214. See Letter from Joseph R. Compoli, Jr., supra note 166.  For example, one such
demand letter states:
We are sending you this letter for the purpose of offering you an opportu-
nity to resolve this matter without the expense of court litigation and
attorneys [sic] fees.  We are authorized to amicably settle this claim for
the amount of $1,700.  This amount represents the sum of $1,500 under
the TCPA and $200 under the CSPA for each unsolicited fax advertise-
ment which was received by our client.  We believe that our proposed
settlement is very fair and reasonable under the circumstances.  We will
leave this offer open for fifteen (15) days from the date of this letter.
Recently, in the case of Nicholson v. Hooters of Augusta, a court in Geor-
gia awarded over $11.8 million in a class action lawsuit under the TCPA.
Also, more recently, in the case of Gold Seal Termite & Pest Control v.
Prime  TV LLC, a court in Indiana has certified a nationwide class action
against Prime TV for sending unsolicited fax advertisements.
Id.; see also Lawsuit Abuse Hearing, supra note 61, at 11 (statement of Karen R.
Harned, Esq., Exec. Dir., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. Legal Found.) (discussing
timeframes for paying the settlement fee, as well as escalation clauses that raise
the price that the business must pay to settle as time passes).
215. Lawsuit Abuse Hearing, supra note 61, at 11 (statement of Karen R. Harned,
Esq., Exec. Dir., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. Legal Found.); see also Letter from
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But the plaintiff, a truck driver, had no authority to bring a claim
that, if it existed, belonged to his employer.216  Even though this case
was baseless, the defendant spent $882.60 (over half the amount of
the settlement costs) for his attorney to draft a letter to the plaintiff’s
lawyer and avoid payment of the demanded settlement.217
1. Threat of Class Actions
Whether a TCPA case can be litigated as a class-action depends
largely on the jurisdiction in which the case is brought.  Courts have
disagreed on whether class-actions are an appropriate way to resolve
TCPA cases.  There are various reasons for the disagreement, but it is
beyond dispute that even the mere threat of a class action can have a
devastating effect on the innocent lawbreaker.218
Some states categorically bar TCPA cases from being litigated as
class actions.  For example, New York has a statutory bar on TCPA
type cases being brought as class actions.219  This statute has been
interpreted as prohibiting lawsuits seeking a penalty from being
brought as a class action absent specific legislative authorization.220
At least one Pennsylvania court has held that national class ac-
tions for violations of the TCPA cannot be brought in Pennsylvania
state courts because not all states allow their citizens to bring TCPA
class actions.221  Thus comity concerns prevent the maintaining of
class actions that include citizens of states where they could not main-
tain such an action in their home state.222
Courts have also held that TCPA cases are inappropriate for class
action status because determining “membership in the class would es-
Kenneth W. Kleinman, counsel for Custom Tool & Gage, Inc., to Joseph R. Com-
poli, Jr. (Mar. 16, 2004) (describing Custom Tool & Gage as “a reputable company
which sells precision materials to manufacturers of products which must meet
exacting tolerances.  The company has been in business for thirty years.  The
company does not send advertising by facsimile to businesses who are not fre-
quent purchasers of its materials.”), reprinted in Lawsuit Abuse Hearing, supra
note 61, app. at 170.
216. Letter from Kenneth W. Kleinman, Attorney at Law, to Joseph R. Compoli, Jr.
(Mar. 16, 2004), as reprinted in Lawsuit Abuse Hearing, supra note 61; see infra
subsection VII.B.1.a.
217. Lawsuit Abuse Hearing, supra note 61, at 11–12 (statement of Karen R. Harned,
Esq., Exec. Dir., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. Legal Found.).
218. See Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Propriety of Class Actions Under Tele-
phone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, 30 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 537 (2008);
supra section V.D.
219. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b) (McKinney 2011).
220. Holster III v. Gatco Inc., 485 F. Supp. 2d 179 (E.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d 618 F.3d 214
(2d Cir. 2010).
221. Weitzner v. Vaccess Am., Inc., 5 Pa. D. & C. 5th 95, 2008 WL 4491534 (2008).
222. Id.
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sentially require a mini-hearing on the merits” of whether each class
member received an “unsolicited” facsimile advertisement.223
Other state courts, have taken a more traditional case-by-case ap-
proach in determining whether a TCPA case can be litigated as a class
action.  In a 2005 Illinois case, the defendant was sued for hiring a
company to send approximately 5,500 faxes advertising his insurance
business.224  At the class certification phase, the plaintiff had no evi-
dence that anyone other than he received the fax at issue and the de-
fendant had no record of prior consent by any recipient.225  Further,
because the company that allegedly transmitted the facsimiles did not
enter an appearance, the court had no direct evidence of any facsimile
being sent or received.226  The court, applying the Illinois version of
the traditional test for class certification,227 found that, although the
numerosity requirement was met, a class should not be certified be-
cause the plaintiff was not a suitable class representative because of
his ties to the law firm he chose to file the claim.228
Courts have also held that Congress did not intend for TCPA
claims to be brought as class actions.229  This congressional intent is
relevant in the consideration of whether a “class action, as opposed to
alternative procedures, provides a superior means for adjudicating the
controversy.”230  A Pennsylvania federal court likewise held that the
TCPA provides for the following:
[A] minimum recovery of $500 for each violation as well as treble damages
if the plaintiff can prove willful or knowing violation.  This most likely exceeds
any actual monetary loss in paper, ink or lost facsimile time suffered by most
plaintiffs in such a case.  The statutory remedy is designed to provide ade-
quate incentive for an individual plaintiff to bring suit on his own behalf.231
223. Forman v. Data Transfer, Inc., 164 F.R.D. 400, 403 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
224. Bernstein v. Am. Family Ins. Co., No. 02 CH 6905, 2005 WL 1613776, at *1 (Ill.
Cir. Ct. July 6, 2005).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. The prerequisites for class certification under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure require the finding of (1) numerosity, (2) commonality, (3) typicality, and (4)
adequate representation. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
228. Bernstein, 2005 WL 1613776, at *4.  The plaintiff was a lawyer who had used the
same law firm to bring previous TCPA cases and had worked together with the
firm in at least two previous class actions that the plaintiff had initiated. Id. at
*3.
229. See Freedman v. Advanced Wireless Commc’ns, Inc., No. SOM-L-611-02, 2005
WL 2122304, at * 2 (N.J. Super. Ct., Law Div. June 24, 2005) (citing 137 CONG.
REC. S16205–06 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hollings) (explaining
that the Act was to provide a private cause of action for a consumer to pursue in
small claims court)).
230. Id. at *2.
231. Forman v. Data Transfer, Inc., 164 F.R.D. 400, 404 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (footnote
omitted) (citations omitted).
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A class action would be inconsistent with the specific and personal
remedy provided by Congress to address the minor nuisance of unso-
licited facsimile advertisements.232 A number of courts have found
that class actions are inappropriate in TCPA cases because individual
issues predominate over common issues.233
Courts have also held that TCPA cases should not be certified as
class actions because class actions are not superior to individual ac-
tions.234  “[T]he superiority prong of a class action is undermined
where there is a readily available individual remedy. . . . Under the
TCPA private action provision, the proofs are simple, the cost low, the
injury small, and the $500 damage award is attractively dispropor-
tionate to the extent of the actual injury.”235
But other courts have held that class actions are permissible be-
cause the Act contains no prohibition of class actions.236  Thus the
threat of a TCPA class being certified for class action treatment is real
in many jurisdictions and TCPA class actions have resulted in enor-
mous damage awards.237  Since average innocent lawbreakers do not
have the legal training or resources to determine if a threat of class
certification contained in a demand letter238 from a TCPA plaintiffs’
lawyer has potential merit, they may choose to settle the case based
on the threat alone.
2. Threat of Piggybacking of State Law Consumer Protection
Claims
In addition to seeking damages for each unsolicited facsimile ad-
vertisement under the TCPA, cottage industry lawyers have sought to
tack on state consumer protection law claims to further increase the
plaintiff’s claimed “damages.”  Though some states have enacted
state-law prohibitions against the transmission of unsolicited facsimi-
les,239 even those that do not have specific prohibitions still have some
232. Id. at 404–05.
233. See Kenro, Inc. v. Fax Daily, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1162 (S.D. Ind. 1997); Livingston
v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 58 P.3d 1088 (Colo. App. 2002); Kondos v. Lincoln Prop. Co.,
110 S.W.3d 716 (Tex. App. 2003).
234. E.g., Freedman, 2005 WL 2122304.
235. Id. at *3, (quoting Levine v. 9 Net Ave., Inc., No. A-1107-00T1, 2001 WL
34013297, at *6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 7, 2001)).
236. See, e.g., ESI Ergonomic Solutions, LLC v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc.,
50 P.3d 844, 850–51 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002).
237. See, e.g., Nicholson v. Hooters of Augusta, Inc., No. 95-RCCV-616 (Ga. Sup. Ct.
Apr. 25, 2001), available at http://www.keytlaw.com/faxes/hooterscase.htm. .
238. Lawsuit Abuse Hearing, supra note 61, at 11–12 (statement of Karen R. Harned,
Esq., Exec. Dir., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. Legal Found.).
239. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN § 44-1482 (2003); CAL. BUS & PROF. CODE § 17538.43
(West 2010); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-702 (2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 46-5-25
(2008); IDAHO CODE § 48-1002 (2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1745 (2003); MD.
COM LAW CODE ANN. § 14-1313 (2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 1496 (2009);
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form of consumer protection legislation.240  Most of these consumer
protection laws seek to deter businesses from engaging in unconscion-
able or unfair dealings with consumers.241
These general consumer protection statutes were designed to pro-
tect individuals against businesses; TCPA plaintiff’s lawyers have ar-
gued that they should also apply to businesses that receive unsolicited
fax advertising.242  The Ohio Supreme Court has rejected this argu-
ment because Ohio’s Consumer Protection Act applies only to “individ-
uals” which the court held means “a single person or human being”
and not a business.243  This is one of the reasons that TCPA cottage
industry lawyers try to argue that individual employees of a business
are the proper party in interest to the suit.244
The Ohio Supreme Court also held that sending a truthful facsim-
ile advertisement, though unsolicited, does not violate Ohio’s Con-
sumer Sales Practices Act.  Instead, in order to prevail on a claim that
the facsimile advertisement violates the consumer protection statute,
plaintiffs “have to make a showing that the unsolicited fax is part of a
consumer transaction that is a deceptive, unfair, or unconscionable
practice.”245
Other states, however, have their own TCPA-like legislation that
specifically allows the recovery of “state” statutory damages in addi-
tion to the federal statutory damages under the Act.246  Again, it is
difficult for an innocent lawbreaker to determine if the threat of addi-
tional state damages is “real” without engaging counsel and spending
significant resources in terms of time and money.
3. Threat of Multiple Violations Per Fax
Not satisfied with demanding $500–$1,500 per unsolicited facsim-
ile, TCPA plaintiffs’ lawyers have demanded this statutory penalty for
each alleged technical violation of the TCPA and FCC rules, demand-
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.1771 (2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.395 (2004);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 31-14-1501 (2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 75-101 (West
Supp. 2010); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 51-07-23 (West 2009); NEB. REV. STAT. § 86-
243 (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-157 (2001); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 396-aa (Mc-
Kinney 2010); OR. REV. STAT. § 646A.360 (2009); PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 73 § 2250.1
(West 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6-47-1 (WEST 2010); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-75-
50 (West Supp. 2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 65-4-501 (1994–95); TEX. BUS. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 35.47 (repealed West 2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-25A-101 (West
2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 80.36.540 (West Supp. 2011); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 134.72 (West 2011).
240. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.01 (West 2004).
241. See id.
242. See, e.g., Culbreath v. Golding Enters., LLC, 872 N.E.2d 284 (Ohio 2007).
243. Id. at 290.
244. See infra subsection V.D.2.
245. Culbreath, 872 N.W.2d at 291.
246. See supra note 239.
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ing multiple statutory penalties for each unsolicited facsimile adver-
tisement.247  In Culbreath v. Golding Enters., LLC, the plaintiff
demanded not only $1,500 for each unsolicited fax advertisement it
received, but additional statutory damages of $1,500 for each techni-
cal violation of FCC regulations each fax allegedly contained.248  In
addition to generally prohibiting the transmission of unsolicited ad-
vertisements by facsimile, Congress made it illegal to transmit such a
facsimile if it did not contain “the date and time it is sent and an iden-
tification of the business, other entity, or individual sending the mes-
sage and the telephone number of the sending machine or of such
business, other entity, or individual.”249  But unlike subsections
227(b) and (c), subsection (d) does not provide for a private cause of
action for individuals who violate it.250  Despite this apparent intent
by Congress not to permit private lawsuits to enforce these technical
violations, plaintiffs’ lawyers attempted to “skirt its provisions”251 by
relying on FCC regulations252 that require similar identifying infor-
mation on facsimiles.253
At least three courts have held that there is a private cause of ac-
tion to enforce provisions of this FCC rule, thus allowing for a sepa-
rate statutory penalty for each violation, even if they were all
contained on the same document.254  But the Ohio Supreme Court,
among other courts, disagreed, finding that because unsolicited fac-
similes are rarely transmitted to a single recipient, there are many
potential plaintiffs who could each recover up to $1,500 per fax under
Section 227(b)(3):
To allow each of those individuals, however, to multiply that award three
times over would create a windfall not contemplated by the statutory scheme.
Moreover, the attorney general could bring a lawsuit for not only sending the
fax but for the technical defects as well.  The prospect of an untold number of
plaintiffs bringing suit, or joining a putative class action suit, combined with
the possibility of a federal court action being initiated by a state attorney gen-
eral for violations of subsection 227(d), serves as a significant deterrent in and
247. See Culbreath, 872 N.E.2d 284.
248. Id. at 286–87; see 47 C.F.R. § 68.318(d) (2011) (requiring that every facsimile con-
tain certain identifying information).
249. 47 U.S.C. § 227(d)(1)(B) (2006).
250. Id. § 227(b), (c), (d).
251. Culbreath, 872 N.E.2d at 288.
252. 47 C.F.R. § 68.318(d).
253. Note that 47 U.S.C § 227(d) is not without an enforcement mechanism.  State
attorneys general can sue to enforce these provisions in federal court under 47
U.S.C. § 227(f)(1).
254. Schraut v. Rocky Mountain Reclamation, No. 01AC-002848 O CV, 2001 TCPA
Rep. 1182, (St. Louis Mo. Cir. Ct. Dec. 18, 2001); Sterling Realty Co. v. Klein, No.
DC-010870-04, 2005 TCPA Rep. 1353, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. Mar. 21, 2005); McK-
enna v. Acurate Comp. Serv., Inc., 2002 TCPA Rep. 1135, (Colo. Dist. Ct. Feb. 24,
2003).  All of these cases are available at http://www.tcpalaw.com.
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of itself without adding a dubious private cause of action for each
violation.255
Thus, at least in Ohio, no private cause of action exists to enforce
the FCC’s technical regulations about the content of the facsimile.256
4. Case Studies
Though there are many instances where innocent lawbreakers
were targeted by the cottage industry of TCPA plaintiffs’ lawyers, the
following two examples are illustrative257 of truly innocent lawbreak-
ers and the TCPA’s unintended consequences.  Both of the below-de-
scribed cases were brought by the same attorney.
i. Members of a Chamber of Commerce
Omerza v. Bryant & Stratton College258 is a case that demon-
strates the ambiguity of the TCPA and the difficulty that an innocent
lawbreaker has in determining if its sending of a facsimile will run
afoul of the TCPA.  In 2003, a small construction company sued a well
respected for-profit college when it received, by facsimile, a two-page
document from the college.259  The first page was a letter addressed to
members of the local chamber of commerce introducing the College
and offering to work with chamber members in both offering training
to their employees and potentially placing College graduates as em-
ployees or interns with the chamber members260.  The second page
was a “fact sheet” describing the College and its programs.261  Both
the College and the construction company were members of the cham-
ber of commerce, and the College obtained the company’s facsimile
number from the chamber of commerce’s directory, where the recipi-
ent chose to list its address and fax number.262
At trial (and in filings before trial) the plaintiff’s lawyer deliber-
ately chose to disregard the first page of the two-page document, fo-
cusing only on the fact sheet that he argued was an advertisement
255. Culbreath, 872 N.E.2d at 289 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted); cf. Klein v.
Vision Lab Telecom., Inc., 399 F. Supp. 2d 528, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
256. Culbreath, 872 N.E.2d at 289.
257. Based on the author’s experience defending TCPA claims, these case studies are
representative of the types of cases brought against innocent lawbreakers.
258. 2007 Ohio 5215 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007).
259. Id. at ¶3; see infra subsection V.D.4.a.  The author was lead defense counsel for
Bryant & Stratton College.  Numerous supporting documents are on file with the
author or at the author’s former law firm, Hahn Loeser & Parks, LLP.
260. Omerza, 2007 Ohio 5215, at ¶5–7.
261. Id. at ¶8.
262. Omerza, 2007-Ohio-5215, at ¶¶3–8.  At trial, the Executive Director of the cham-
ber of commerce testified that members could choose not to list a facsimile num-
ber in the directory. See Omerza v. Bryant & Stratton Coll., No. 05 CV 001237
(Ohio Ct. Comm. Pl. May 9, 2006).
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because it encouraged recipients to enroll in the for-profit College.263
Defense counsel argued that the document, taken as a whole, was not
an advertisement because, among other reasons, the business to
which it was directed could not be a student at the College.264  At
trial, the Executive Director of the chamber of commerce testified that
she encouraged communications such as the one at issue between
members of the chamber.265  She told the court and jury that exchang-
ing information like what was contained in the facsimile, or network-
ing, was the very essence of why businesses join the chamber of
commerce.266
After many thousands of dollars in legal fees267, the defendant pre-
vailed when the trier of fact determined that the document at issue
was not an advertisement under the TCPA.268  Not satisfied, the
plaintiff’s counsel unsuccessfully appealed, costing the College even
more money in defense costs.269
In this case, Bryant & Stratton College, an institution founded in
1854 with sixteen campuses in four states, decided to fight what it
perceived as a frivolous lawsuit.  It had the resources to do so.  Many
innocent lawbreakers do not.270
ii. Who Can Give Consent?
As the use of facsimile machines in general, and to transmit adver-
tising in particular, declines, and as businesses that send fax advertis-
ing become more aware of the TCPA, the cottage industry of TCPA
plaintiff’s lawyers have fewer cases to file.  But because bringing
TCPA lawsuits is their primary business model, some of these lawyers
resort to manufacturing lawsuits and arguments where no legitimate
claim exists.  One such example involved the 2009 lawsuit by an op-
tometrist against an eyeglass manufacturer.271
The plaintiff (suing both in the name of the optometry business
and the individual “owner”) alleged that the defendant had transmit-
ted by facsimile a number of unsolicited advertisements for




267. The author, as lead defense counsel, was responsible for billing legal fees to the
client.
268. Omerza, 2007 Ohio 5215, at ¶9.
269. Id. at ¶31.
270. See supra sections V.C–D.
271. Jacobson v. Jonathan Paul Eyewear, No. 09-CV-003340 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Jan.
26, 2011) (granting, in part, defendant’s motion for sanctions).
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eyewear.272  The defendant, aware of the TCPA’s restrictions, claimed
that it had obtained express permission from one of the Defendant’s
employees to transmit the faxes.273  The defendant not only had a
database record of the telephone conversation in which it claimed it
received consent and addressed the facsimiles to the individual from
whom it received consent, but still employed the individual who spoke
with the plaintiff’s employee to obtain that consent.274
Undeterred by this evidence of prior express consent, the plaintiff’s
counsel attempted to suppress the evidence of consent by refusing to
allow the defendant to depose the plaintiff’s employee who had alleg-
edly given consent.275  Plaintiff’s counsel argued, among other spuri-
ous claims, that before the defendant could seek to depose the
plaintiff’s employee the defendant needed to be in possession of inde-
pendent proof of the claimed prior consent.276
Counsel also argued that the defendant’s employee, who claims to
have spoken with the plaintiff’s employee, could not testify because
his statements would be hearsay.277  Despite the obviously specious
nature of these arguments, plaintiff’s counsel was able to force the de-
fendant to spend significant legal fees to force the court to order the
deposition.278  Further, when the court finally ordered the plaintiff’s
employee to be deposed, plaintiff’s counsel dismissed the lawsuit.279
But the defendant, a small business with limited resources, was still
forced to spend over ten thousand dollars in legal fees, which it will
likely never recover.280
VI. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TCPA JUNK FAX
PROVISIONS AND OTHER FEDERAL CONSUMER
PROTECTION STATUTES
There are numerous Federal consumer protection statutes: some
addressing what can be regarded as annoyances or inconveniences,
272. The facts described here are based on the author’s interview and e-mail exchange
with the lead counsel for Defendant Johnathan Paul Eyewear—Michael B. Pas-








280. After the dismissal, the defendant filed a motion for sanctions which was granted
by a magistrate.  But the award of $1,482 in sanctions will reimburse the defen-
dant for only a tiny portion of the attorneys’ fees spent in defending the case.
Jacobson v. Jonathan Paul Eyewear, No. 09-CV-003340, slip op. (Ohio Ct. Com.
Pl., Lake Cnty. Jan. 26, 2011) (granting, in part, defendant’s motion for
sanctions).
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some addressing true fraud, and some addressing unfair practices.281
But few of these other federal consumer protection statutes have strict
liability private rights of action like the anti-junk fax provision of the
TCPA.  This section will address only two such statutes: the anti-
telemarketing provision of the TCPA and the CAN-SPAM Act.
Neither of these provisions is as harsh to innocent lawbreakers at the
anti-junk fax provision of the Act.
A. TCPA’s Anti Telemarketing Provisions
Before discussing other federal consumer protection statutes, it is
important to examine the part of the TCPA which regulates commer-
cial telemarketing activities.282  The first of these provisions prohibits
the use of an “automatic telephone dialing system283 or an artificial or
prerecorded voice” to make calls to an emergency telephone line (like
9-1-1 or a poison control center), to a telephone line of a hospital pa-
tient, or to a mobile phone or pager.284  The second provision prohibits
calling a residential telephone line “using an artificial or prerecorded
voice to deliver a message” without the resident’s consent unless the
call is for emergency purposes or exempted by FCC rule.285  The final
281. Some examples of other Federal consumer protection statutes include the follow-
ing: (1) The Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act.  15
U.S.C. § 6101. Enacted in 1994, it seeks to protect consumers from interstate
telemarketing fraud.  This act does provide for a private cause of action, but only
when the amount in controversy is $50,000 or greater.  It allows an individual to
seek injunctive relief, enforce compliance with agency rules, or damages. See
§ 6104(a).  It also provides that state attorneys general may file civil actions to
enjoin the illegal activities or seek damages.  (2) The Fair Debt Collection Prac-
tices Act.  15 U.S.C. § 1692. Enacted in 1977, it seeks to protect consumers from
abusive practices of debt collectors.  The law allows for enforcement by individu-
als or class actions, see § 1692k(a)(2)(A)-(B), as well as enforcement by the Fed-
eral Trade Commission.  Litigants can recover their actual damages plus up to a
maximum of $1,000 in statutory damages.  Class action recoveries are capped at
the lesser of $500,000 or 1 percent of net worth of the debt collector.  (3) The Fair
Credit Reporting Act.  15 U.S.C. § 1681.  Enacted in 1970, it regulates collection,
dissemination, and use of consumer credit information.  In addition to enforce-
ment by the Federal Trade Commission, a private cause of action can also be
brought. See § 1681n(a)(1)(A); see, e.g., Welch v. Target Nat’l Bank, No. 2:08-cv-
705-ftM-29SPC, 2009 WL 1659708 (M.D. Fla. June 15, 2009).  Individuals bring-
ing private actions can recover actual damages plus $100–1,000 for willful non-
compliance.  15 U.S.C. § 1681n.  But when the violation is negligent non-compli-
ance, the consumer may recover only her actual damages. § 1681o.
282. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A), (B), and (D) (2006).
283. The term “automatic telephone dialing system” is defined as “equipment which
has the capacity—(A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a
random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.” Id.
§ 227(a)(1).
284. Id.  § 227(b)(1)(A).
285. Id. § 227(b)(1)(B).  Among the exceptions authorized by the FCC is that of an
established business relationship. See 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(2)(iv).
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prohibition is against using an automatic telephone dialing system to
tie up two or more phone lines of a business at the same time.286
Though these prohibitions are absolute—like the anti-junk fax provi-
sion—they have generated far less litigation.287  And these provisions
are far less likely to affect small businesses, because few, if any, have
automatic telephone dialing systems or the ability to deliver prer-
ecorded messages.  It is only professional telemarketers—businesses
that the TCPA intends to regulate—that would have the ability to vio-
late these provisions.  Further, the prohibition against using prer-
ecorded or automated voices applies only to residential telephone
numbers—a limitation that does not exist in the unsolicited facsimile
prohibition.288
The TCPA also gave the FCC authority to prescribe rules to regu-
late other telemarketing activities short of those absolutely prohibited
by the Act.289  Under this authority, the FCC was directed to enact
rules “to protect residential telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to
avoid receiving telephone solicitations to which they object.”290  But,
unlike the anti-junk fax provisions of the TCPA, privacy-driven rules
allow for a private right of action only if the consumer received “more
than one call within any 12-month period” from the same entity in
violation of the FCC regulations.291
B. The CAN-SPAM Act
The conveniences of facsimile communications have been largely
replaced by an even faster and cheaper form of written communica-
tion: electronic mail.  Marketers did not fail to notice, and take advan-
tage of, this new form of mass communication.  Just as junk faxers
could send millions of facsimiles a month,292 junk e-mailers could
send millions of e-mails an hour.293  In response to the annoyance to
consumers of wading through unwanted commercial e-mails, Congress
enacted the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003.294  This law establishes national
standards for sending commercial e-mails and protects consumers
286. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(D).
287. A search of all cases reported on Westlaw revealed only 65 cases that cite to these
provisions.
288. Compare 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B) (noting the prohibition against prerecorded or
automated voices with residential telephone numbers), with 47 U.S.C.
§ 227(b)(1)(C) (noting the unsolicited facsimile prohibition).
289. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c).
290. Id. 227(c)(1).  These regulations are codified in 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200.
291. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5).
292. See supra subsection IV.B.1.
293. See Dan Fletcher, A Brief History of Spam, TIME (November 2, 2009), http://
www.time.com/time/business/ article/0,8599,1933796,00.html.
294. CAN-SPAM Act, Pub. L. No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699 (2003) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 7701 (2004)).
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from, among other things, mobile phone spam.295  Unlike the TCPA,
however, the CAN-SPAM provides practically no private right of ac-
tion.296  In fact, the law prohibits individuals who receive unsolicited
commercial e-mails from suing the sender and preempts state laws
that may have stricter penalties or rights of private enforcement.297
Enforcement of the law is left to federal agencies like the Federal
Trade Commission and the states, which can seek penalties of up to
thirty-five dollars per e-mail.298  Again, unlike the TCPA which has no
damages cap,299 damages under the CAN-SPAM Act are capped at
two million dollars.300
The CAN-SPAM Act is relevant to the discussion of the TCPA be-
cause of the move away from traditional facsimile machines to com-
puter server based faxing.  As discussed below, these technological
advances blur the line between a fax and an e-mail.  Yet an innocent
lawbreaker who sends an unsolicited advertisement to a phone num-
ber rather than an e-mail address faces much stiffer penalties, even
though the result from the point of view of the recipient is identical—
an image on a computer screen that can be easily deleted without
printing.301
VII. EVENING THE SCALE
It is evident that the costs to small businesses of the junk fax liti-
gation explored in this Article are grossly disproportionate to the
small benefit conferred on consumers who receive these unsolicited
facsimiles.  In light of the technological changes discussed above302,
the best solution to this problem is congressional action that elimi-
295. Id.
296. See, e.g., Gordon v. Virtumundo, Inc., 575 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2009).  The Ninth
Circuit noted the following:
We, like Congress, are sympathetic to legitimate operations hampered
by a deluge of unwanted e-mail marketing.  Our record, however, conclu-
sively demonstrates that this is not the case before us.  [The Plaintiff]
has created a cottage industry where he and his ‘clients’ set themselves up
to profit from litigation.  The CAN-SPAM Act was enacted to protect in-
dividuals and legitimate businesses—not to support a litigation mill for
entrepreneurs like [the Plaintiff].
Id. at 1057 (emphasis added).  This same language is equally applicable to TCPA
litigation against innocent lawbreakers. See supra subsection V.A.
297. Gordon, 575 F.3d 1040; see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-570c (West 2005);
FLA. STAT. § 668.60 (2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-6,107 (2005); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 57-12-23 (2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.64 (LexisNexis 2005); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 776.1 (West 2010); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7661 (West
2010); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6G-1 (2010).
298. See 15 U.S.C. § 7704 (2006).
299. See 47 U.S.C. § 227.
300. 15 U.S.C. § 7706 (f)(3)(B) (2006).
301. See supra section III.A.
302. See supra section III.A.
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nates or severely restricts the private cause of action.  But since Con-
gress and the FCC have rejected cries from small business to seriously
amend the Act, courts must step in to even the scales in TCPA junk
fax litigation.  The courts can do this by strictly enforcing traditional
litigation requirements and by applying traditional legal require-
ments to limit punitive awards.
A. Requiring that the Plaintiff Prove that the Unsolicited
Facsimile was Received Using a Traditional
Facsimile Machine
The simplest way for courts to ensure the proper balance between
senders and receivers of unsolicited facsimiles is to properly interpret
and follow the TCPA itself.  The first thing a court must consider is
whether the plaintiff’s alleged injury is one that is compensable under
the Act.  In other words, did the defendant violate the TCPA when it
transmitted the offending facsimile.  The TCPA’s definition of a “tele-
phone facsimile machine”303 and Congress’ intent in passing the Act
make it clear that the law prohibits transmitting unsolicited adver-
tisements only to traditional facsimile machines.304  Thus to violate
the TCPA, the machine that receives an unsolicited advertisement
must be one that receives an electronic signal over a regular telephone
line and automatically renders that signal into an image on paper.305
In other words, the machine must be connected to a regular telephone
line, and must be capable of printing an incoming message onto paper
without human intervention.306
This definition best reflects the intent and purpose of the TCPA—
to prevent an advertiser from tying-up an unwitting recipient’s tele-
phone line and forcing the recipient to pay for the printing of the
sender’s advertisement onto the recipient’s paper.307  Any broader
303. 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(3) (2006).
304. See supra subsection II.C.1.
305. 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(3) (“The term ‘telephone facsimile machine’ means equipment
which has the capacity (A) to transcribe text or images, or both, from paper into
an electronic signal and to transmit that signal over a regular telephone line, or
(B) to transcribe text or images (or both) from an electronic signal received over a
regular telephone line onto paper.” (emphasis added)); see also infra subsection
VII.A.2 (discussing the plain language and intended scope of TCPA).
306. 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(3).
307. S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 1968 (1991) (“The bill also prohibits unsolicited advertise-
ments sent to fax machines, known as junk fax.  Advertisements today are sent
for cruises, home products, investments, and all kinds of products and services
without the consent of the person receiving them.  These unsolicited advertise-
ments prevent the owners from using their own fax machines for business pur-
poses.  Even worse, these transmissions force the recipient to pay for the cost of
the paper used to receive them.  These junk fax advertisements can be a severe
impediment to carrying out legitimate business practices and ought to be abol-
ished.”); see also supra subsection II.C.1 (arguing that Congress’s reasons for
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reading of the definition, like the one prescribed by the FCC and fol-
lowed by a number of courts,308 fails to carry out the intention of the
TCPA, and, instead, unjustifiably feeds the junk fax cottage industry.
1. The FCC’s Incorrect Interpretation of the Act
As facsimile technology evolved from the traditional facsimile ma-
chine in common use when the TCPA was enacted to the use of com-
puterized facsimile servers and personal computers to receive
facsimiles,309 courts and the FCC were tasked with deciding whether
the Act applied to these new fax machines.  In 2003, the FCC incor-
rectly expanded the scope of the TCPA to include other types of de-
vices that are capable of receiving facsimile transmissions—devices
that are not directly connected to regular phone lines and that do not
automatically print the document on paper, ruling that “personal com-
puters equipped with, or attached to, modems and computerized fax
servers” fall within the definition of a telephone facsimile machine
under the TCPA.310
As explained below, this interpretation is incorrect, and should not
be followed by courts that hear TCPA cases because this expanded
definition is improper as a matter of statutory interpretation, and,
most importantly, addresses a “harm” that was not contemplated by
Congress when it enacted the TCPA.  It also allows, in effect, for a
private cause of action under the TCPA for the receipt of an unsolic-
ited commercial e-mail, something that the CAN-SPAM Act, which ad-
dresses unwanted e-mails, does not permit.311
2. The Plain Language and Intended Scope of the TCPA
It is evident from the language of the TCPA that Congress in-
tended only to protect users of traditional facsimile machines from un-
passing the TCPA were (1) to keep unwanted faxes from tying up recipients’
phone lines and (2) it is patently unfair for the recipients to have to bear the cost
of sending unwanted advertisements).
308. See, e.g., Holtzman v. Caplice, No. 07 C 7279, 2008 WL 2168762, at *7 (N.D. Ill.
May 23, 2008) (deferring to the FCC’s order); supra subsection V.A.1.
309. See supra section III.A.
310. In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act of 1991, 18 FCC Rcd. 14014, 14133 (2003) (“We conclude that faxes sent to
personal computers equipped with, or attached to, modems and to computerized
fax servers are subject to the TCPA’s prohibition on unsolicited faxes.”).  The FCC
reasoned that a broad interpretation was necessary to prevent faxers from easily
side-stepping the junk fax provision. Id.  In arriving at this conclusion, the FCC
reasoned incorrectly that faxes sent to computer servers would still shift adver-
tising costs to the recipients “if they are printed,” tie up the recipient’s phone
lines, and increase the recipient’s labor costs. Id.  As discussed in section III.A,
supra, this is simply not the case.
311. 15 U.S.C. § 7701 (2006); see supra section VI.B.
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solicited fax advertisements.312  Before the enactment of the CAN-
SPAM Act,313 some litigants tried to us the TCPA to bring action
against senders of commercial, unsolicited e-mails.314  In a 2003
Pennsylvania case, the plaintiff demanded $9,000 in statutory dam-
ages after receiving six e-mail advertisements.315  The plaintiff ar-
gued that the TCPA’s definition of “telephone facsimile machine” can
include unsolicited commercial e-mail because his personal computer
was attached to a telephone line and a printer, giving it the “capacity
to transcribe text or images (or both) from an electronic signal . . . onto
paper.”316  This is the very justification used by the FCC in deciding
that computer fax servers were telephone facsimile machines.317  But
unlike the FCC, the Aronson court properly concluded that the TCPA
does not apply to e-mail transmissions.  As the court noted, the TCPA
prohibits the use of “any telephone facsimile machine, computer or
other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone fac-
simile machine.”318   The court further noted:
If a computer and a FAX machine were considered one in the same, there
would be no need to specifically include a computer as among the types of
‘sending’ equipment.  It would have been sufficient to describe a telephone fac-
simile machine as both the sending and receiving instrument.  Notably, only
the term ‘telephone facsimile machine’ is set forth as the receiving equipment.
A ‘computer’ is not included despite the fact that it is included as a device
which may send an unsolicited advertisement.319
Employing the statutory construction maxim of expression unius
est exclusion alterius,320 the court concluded that the inclusion of only
a telephone facsimile machine in the receiving equipment section nec-
essarily excludes computers as a piece of receiving equipment that can
lead to a TCPA claim.321
The Pennsylvania appellate court (in disagreement with the later
conclusion of the FCC) further held that the plain language of the defi-
312. See supra section VII.A.
313. 15 U.S.C. § 7701; see supra section VI.B.
314. Most of these cases arose before the passage of the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003,
which regulates the transmission of commercial e-mail (commonly known as
SPAM). But as discussed in section VI.B, the CAN-SPAM Act does not provide for
a private right of action.  Thus, the cottage industry of TCPA litigants, with the
blessing of the FCC, continue to file TCPA claims even when the “facsimile” was
received by a server and converted to an e-mail.
315. Aronson v. Bright-Teeth Now, LLC., 824 A.2d 320, 321 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
316. Id.; see also 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(3) (2006) (defining telephone facsimile machines).
317. See supra subsection VII.A.1.
318. Aronson, 824 A.2d at 321 (emphasis added) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C)).
319. Id. at 321–22 (emphasis added).
320. Id. at 322 (“[T]he mention of one thing implies the exclusion of others not
expressed.”).
321. Id.
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nition of a telephone facsimile machine necessarily excludes com-
puters because “a computer does not have the capacity to print.”322
There can be little doubt that Congress agreed that electronic mail
transmission of unsolicited commercial advertising was different from
the transmission of similar content by fax.  As discussed above, Con-
gress enacted a separate federal law to deal with unsolicited e-mail
more than a decade after the passage of the TCPA—the CAN-SPAM
Act of 2003.323
Agreeing with reasoning of the Aronson court, in the context of de-
ciding whether a TCPA case can be maintained as a class action, an
Illinois court thought it important to know what kind of equipment
was used to receive the facsimiles at issue.324  Because the actual fax
transmitter chose not to participate in the litigation, “the Court [was]
unable to find whether [the faxes] were sent by regular facsimile
which would cause an automatic printing or computer which in [sic]
no printing of the message occurs without deliberate action on behalf
of the recipient.”325
The plain language of the Act and these cases support the position
that Congress’s main concern in passing the TCPA was the cost shift-
ing caused by the automatic printing of unsolicited facsimiles received
on traditional fax machines.326  This cost shifting is not present when
faxes are received using a computer fax server because the recipient
can choose to not print the document, thus not incurring paper and
toner costs.  Congress’s further concern that unsolicited faxes can tie-
up the recipient’s facsimile telephone line,327 thus preventing legiti-
mate messages from going through, is also not present in fax server
cases because most computerized fax servers can receive multiple
transmissions at the same time.328
322. Id.  The court stated:
A computer user reading a message may elect to print that message and
send that message to a printer to accomplish that task.  This function is
entirely different from the printing function of a FAX machine which,
after receiving a transmitted message over a phone line, prints out a
copy of the message.  The user does not read the message before it is
printed and does not have the capability of determining whether to elect
to have the message printed.
. . . A computer does not merely transcribe a message from a signal re-
ceived over a regular telephone line onto paper as does a FAX machine.
Simply stated, a computer is not a FAX machine.
Id.
323. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701–7713 (2006); see supra section VI.B.
324. Bernstein v. Am. Family Ins. Co., No. 02-CH 6905, 2005 WL 1613776 (Ill. Cir. Ct.
July 6, 2005).
325. Id. at *1.
326. See supra subsection II.C.1.
327. See supra subsection II.C.1.
328. Some courts bypassed the Act’s requirement that the facsimile be received on a
traditional facsimile machine by holding that the plaintiff’s “fax server was un-
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B. Strictly Enforcing Traditional Litigation Requirements
The most straight-forward way that trial courts can ensure the
proper balance between enforcing the TCPA and protecting innocent
lawbreakers from the Act’s unintended consequences is by applying
long-accepted traditional litigation requirements to these cases.  Too
often, either because of ignorance by pro se defendants or poor “lawy-
ering” by defense counsel, trial courts do little to analyze the procedu-
ral and substantive fairness of the litigation.  By ensuring that
procedural and substantive safeguards are followed, fewer innocent
lawbreakers will suffer undue financial damages.
1. Standing
The question of standing to bring TCPA claims arises in a number
of contexts.  First, some plaintiffs’ lawyers (and courts) contend that it
is the sending of an unsolicited facsimile that is the violation, and so
receipt is immaterial to maintain the claim.  Second, some in the
TCPA cottage industry have tried (sometimes successfully) to set up a
business of buying TCPA lawsuits by paying recipients of unsolicited
faxes to assign their TCPA claims.
i. Real Party in Interest
Where a small business is sued by an individual who was not the
intended recipient of the facsimile at issue, the issue of who has stand-
ing is critical in protecting innocent lawbreakers form unwarranted
litigation.329  The issue of real party in interest is important because
some states only allow individuals to bring certain consumer protec-
tion claims.330  Thus if the TCPA suit is brought in the name of an
individual, state law may allow recovery of damages in addition to the
TCPA’s statutory penalties, which would not be permissible if the suit
was brought by a business entity.331
But as is evidenced by the above-cited example, innocent lawbreak-
ers often have to spend significant amounts in legal fees to determine
who is the real party in interest.332  Courts must therefore be careful
available to receive or transmit other faxes” while it was receiving the unsolicited
advertisements. See, e.g., Covington & Burling v. Int’l Marketing & Research,
Inc., No. CIV.A.01-0004360, 2003 WL 21384825, at *3 (D.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 17,
2003).  But this reasoning finds no support in the language of the TCPA.  The
“hijacking” of a company’s fax server by a major blast faxer may well be actiona-
ble—but not under the TCPA.
329. See supra Part V.
330. See supra subsection V.D.3.
331. See supra subsection V.D.3.
332. In the case study discussed in subsection V.D.4.a, the author had to wait until the
deposition of the named plaintiff (an individual) to learn that the facsimile ma-
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when examining initial pleadings in a TCPA case to ensure that the
named plaintiff is the party who has the right to bring the action.
ii. Assignability of TCPA Claims
As the TCPA litigation cottage industry has developed, some enter-
prising lawyers have sought to make a true business out of bringing
unsolicited facsimile claims under the TCPA.  In order to profitably
operate such a business, these lawyers need to acquire a large volume
of claims.  Though some lawyers will solicit cases from facsimile ma-
chine owners, which are brought in the name of the facsimile recipi-
ent, more creative lawyers have themselves sent facsimiles offering to
buy claims from recipients of unsolicited faxes.333  These lawyers—
turned TCPA entrepreneurs—then bring the cases in the name of
their own business to which the claim has been assigned by the origi-
nal recipient.  The question of whether these assignees have standing
to bring TCPA claims has been addressed by a number of state courts,
with non-uniform results.334  The courts that have decided this ques-
tion do agree that the issue is governed by state law.335
Colorado courts have held that TCPA claims are not assignable be-
cause the TCPA provides for a penalty in the form of liquidated dam-
ages.336  In Kruse v. McKenna,337 the Colorado Supreme Court held
that under its state law, “a claim for liquidated damages under the
TCPA is a claim for a penalty which cannot be assigned.”338  If a claim
under the TCPA is unassignable, an assignee bringing such a claim
will lack standing because he has not suffered an “injury in fact” to a
legally protected right.339  The Court in Kruse, like other courts,340
looked to descendability of a claim to determine if the claim is assigna-
chine on which the alleged unsolicited facsimile was received was owned by a
corporation.
333. See “Get Paid for Faxes!” advertisement, reprinted in Letter from Dan Danner,
supra note 3.
334. E.g., Kruse v. McKenna, 178 P.3d 1198 (Colo. 2008).
335. Courts have so held that because the private right of action provision of the TCPA
allows state court action “if otherwise permitted by laws or rules of court of [the]
state.”  47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) (2006).  “We construe this language as a statutory
command to apply state substantive law in determining which persons or entities
may bring TCPA claims in state court.” Kruse, 178 P.3d at 1200.
336. E.g., id. at 1202; see US Fax Law Ctr., Inc. v. iHire, Inc., 476 F.3d 1112 (10th Cir.
2007).
337. Kruse, 178 P.3d 1198.
338. Id.  As discussed in sections III.A and B, supra, since the actual damages suffered
by a recipient of an unsolicited facsimile are, at most, nominal, the author is una-
ware of any TCPA case where the plaintiff sought actual, as opposed to statutory,
damages.
339. Kruse, 178 P.3d at 1199.
340. E.g., Micheletti v. Moidel, 32 P.2d 266, (Colo. 1934) (“The general rule is that
assignability and descendibility go hand in hand.”).
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ble.341  In Colorado, claims for punitive damages or penalties are non-
descendable.342  Thus the real question facing the Court in Kruse was
whether a claim for statutory damages343 under the TCPA is a pen-
alty claim.  In answering, the court applied a test it previously devel-
oped to determine whether a statutory claim is “one for a penalty in
the context of determining the correct statute of limitations to apply;”
the test looked at whether: “(1) the statute asserted a new and distinct
cause of action; (2) the claim would allow recovery without proof of
actual damages; and (3) the claim would allow an award in excess of
actual damages.”344
It is easy to see why, under such a test, the Court in Kruse held
that a claim for statutory damages under the TCPA is “a claim for a
penalty.”345
Not every state has a statute like Colorado’s.  But most states do
have either statutory or common-law rules governing the assignability
of causes of action.346  In determining whether TCPA claims are as-
signable, courts should consider Congress’ intent in allowing for a pri-
vate cause of action.  That intent clearly argues against the
permissibility of assigning TCPA claims.347
2. Knowingly/Willfully
The TCPA allows a litigant bringing a private enforcement action
to recover statutory damages of $500 per violation (each unsolicited
facsimile advertisement).348  The Act further states:
341. Kruse, 178 P.3d at 1200.
342. Colorado Revised Statute section 13-20-101 (2003) provides the following:
All causes of action, except actions for slander or libel, shall survive and
may be brought or continued notwithstanding the death of the person in
favor or against whom such action has accrued, but punitive damages
shall not be awarded nor penalties adjudged after the death of the person
against whom such punitive damages or penalties are claimed.
(emphasis added).
343. The plaintiff-assignee in Kruse did not seek compensation for actual money loss
to himself or the assignor. Kruse, 178 P.3d at 1200.
344. Id. at 1201.
345. Id.  The court dismissed Kruse’s argument that the statutory award was de-
signed not only to compensate the recipient for the use of its paper and toner/ink,
but also to compensate for damages incurred by the recipient as a result of the
facsimile tying up his or her fax machine and disrupting his or her business. Id.
(“[T]he TCPA’s fax provisions are not limited to businesses, and in any event not
every unsolicited fax to a business will disrupt that business.  Even when an un-
solicited fax to a business does cause an interruption, there has been no showing
that such damages could consistently approach $500 per fax.”).
346. E.g., Sullivan v. Curling, 99 S.E. 533, 534 (Ga. 1919).
347. See supra subsection II.C.1.
348. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) (2006).  As discussed in subsection V.D.3, supra, some
cottage industry lawyers have argued that additional $500 penalties can be had
for multiple violations of FCC rules in each facsimile.  These lawyers have also
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If the court finds that the defendant willfully or knowingly violated this
subsection or the regulations prescribed under this section, the court may, in
its discretion, increase the amount of the award to an amount equal to not
more than 3 times the amount available under subparagraph (B) of this
paragraph.349
Courts have interpreted this provision to mean that damages of
$1,500 per violation should almost always be awarded.350  But this
could not have been what Congress intended, and is grossly unfair
when applied to innocent lawbreakers.
Charvat v. Ryan351 exemplifies the quintessential innocent law-
breaker.  The defendant, Thomas Ryan, a local dentist, used auto-
mated dialing equipment to call Charvat and advertise dental
services.352  While trying to comply with the law, Ryan contacted the
Ohio Attorney General’s office prior to starting his telemarketing cam-
paign and was told that all he had to do was download and honor the
federal do-not-call list.353  But Charvat chose not to place his number
on the do-not-call list.354
Though Ryan admitted that he made the telemarketing call using
automated dialing equipment, the trial court did not award treble
damages to Charvat, quoting a previous appellate case involving
Charvat that held “ ‘[a] defendant must affirmatively know it is violat-
ing a regulation when making the telephone call for purposes of the
treble damages provision.’”355  Not satisfied with receiving only
been known to suggest that the statutory penalty should apply to each page of a
multi-page facsimile transmission that is sent at one time. See, e.g., Omerza v.
Bryant & Stratton Coll., 2007 Ohio 5215 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007).
349. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) (2006).
350. See, e.g., Charvat v. Ryan, 879 N.E.2d 765, 772 (Ohio 2007).  Though the Ryan
case involved an alleged violation of the telemarketing probation of the TCPA,
the court’s analysis applies equally to the unsolicited facsimile provision of the
Act because both prohibitions share the same private cause of action provision.
See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3).
351. Ryan, 879 N.E.2d 765.
352. Id. at 767.
353. Id. at 768 n.1.
354. Id. Although the Ryan court, citing State ex rel. Charvat v. Frye, 868 N.E.2d 270
(Ohio 2007), correctly held that registration on the do-not-call list is not a prereq-
uisite to maintaining an action under the TCPA, the fact that Charvat, chose not
to register his number flies in the face of arguments raised by the cottage indus-
try that the reason they bring TCPA claims is to stop unwanted phone calls and
faxes.  If Charvat was truly trying to stop the “intrusions” to his life caused by
telemarketing and unsolicited faxes, it is hard to believe that he would not have
registered his number.  Instead, it is safe to assume, based on the twenty-nine
decisions involving Charvat bringing TCPA-related claims reported on
Westlaw.com as of March 27, 2011, that he welcomes “unwanted” phone calls and
faxes as a way to make money. See, e.g., Charvat v. Dispatch Consumer Servs.,
769 N.E.2d 829 (Ohio 2001); Frye, 868 N.E.2d 270.
355. Ryan, 879 N.E.2d at 768 (quoting Charvat v. Colorado Prime, No. 97APG09, 1998
WL 634922 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 17, 1998)).
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$1,000356 for the phone call, Charvat appealed, ultimately to the Ohio
Supreme Court.  Charvat argued that knowingly should mean only
that the defendant had knowledge of the facts that constitute the of-
fense.357  Ryan urged the court to require proof that the defendant
had a “culpable mental state” before treble damages could be
awarded.358
The Ohio Supreme Court acknowledged that knowingly was not
defined in the TCPA.359  However, instead of analyzing what Con-
gress intended when it already allowed  punitive statutory damages of
$500 per violation to be trebled in TCPA cases where actual damages
are nominal, the court looked to criminal law for a definition, where
the widely accepted maxim of “ignorance of the law is no excuse” gen-
erally applies.360  Thus the court held that to “establish a knowing
violation of the TCPA . . . , a plaintiff must prove only that the defen-
dant knew that it acted or failed to act in a manner that violated the
statute, not that the defendant knew that the conduct itself consti-
tuted a violation of law.”361
The Court in Ryan then went on to define willfully as practically
indistinguishable from knowingly, agreeing with and deferring to the
FCC’s determination that “a willful violation means that the ‘violator
knew that he was doing the act in question . . . [and that the] violator
need not know that his action or inaction constitutes a violation; igno-
rance of the law is not a defense or mitigating circumstance.’”362
The $500 statutory penalty collectable by a TCPA litigant is al-
ready about 10,000 times higher than actual damages.363  A penalty of
$1,500 per violation is 30,000 times actual damages.364  It is incon-
356. The intermediate court of appeals held that Ryan committed two violations of the
TCPA in the one phone call (which itself is of questionable logic), but held that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Ryan’s violations were
not willful. Id.
357. Id. at 769.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 770 (quoting Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 192 (1998)
(“ ‘[K]nowingly’ does not necessarily have any reference to a culpable state of
mind or to any knowledge of the law. . . . Thus, unless the text of the statute
dictates a different result, the term ‘knowingly’ merely requires proof of knowl-
edge of the facts that constitute the offense.”).
361. Id.
362. Id. at 771 (quoting In re Dynasty Mortg., L.L.C., 22 FCC Rcd. 9453, 9470 n.86
(2007)).  The Ohio Supreme Court thus held that to “establish a willful violation
of the [TCPA], for an award of treble damages, a plaintiff must prove that the
defendant consciously and deliberately committed or omitted an act that violated
the statute, irrespective of any intent to violate the law.” Id.
363. This estimate assumes actual damages of $.05 per fax. See supra section III.B. In
the cases of facsimiles received using servers as opposed to traditional facsimile
machines, actual damages are zero.
364. See supra section III.B.
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ceivable that Congress could have intended for this enhanced penalty
to apply to run-of-the-mill cases.  But following the Court’s reasoning
in Ryan, it is hard to imagine any violation of the TCPA that would
not entitle the plaintiff to demand treble damages.365
Instead, Congress must have intended this additional penalty to
apply to egregious violations, or cases where the fax transmitter con-
tinued to send faxes after a recipient demanded that they stop.  De-
spite its broad definition of “willful,” this is how the FCC has applied
enhanced penalties—imposing higher fines on violators who continue
to violate the Act after being directed to cease transmissions.366
Some courts have been hesitant to award treble damages for viola-
tions of the Act—even against fax blasters.  For example, a D.C. trial
court, even after concluding that defendant Fax.com knew of the
TCPA, had been cited by the FCC for sending unsolicited faxes, and
had been previously sued for violation of the Act, awarded a plaintiff
treble damages only for faxes received after the plaintiff had de-
manded that Fax.com cease further facsimile transmissions.367
Courts hearing TCPA cases must be careful to limit the application
of this treble statutory damages provision to cases where the violators
of the Act are truly deserving.  Innocent lawbreakers can, by defini-
tion, never fall into this category because their actions are not willful
as that term should be applied to the TCPA.  A knowing or willful
violation is one where the transmitter knows that his actions are un-
365. The Ryan court tried to mitigate the impact of its decision by noting:
Because Congress chose to employ a low threshold to assess treble dam-
ages, by requiring a caller’s actions to be ‘knowing’ or ‘willful,’ it is im-
portant to highlight the language of the second part of the provision for
treble damages: ‘[T]he court may, in its discretion, increase the amount
of the award to an amount equal to not more than 3 times the amount’ of
the greater of $500 or the actual money loss.
Ryan, 879 N.E.2d at 771.  This admonition is of little help to the innocent law-
breaker like Ryan.  He must still endure the legal fees associated with litigating a
case with unknown potential damages, see supra section V.D, but is also subject
to additional legal fees fighting an appeal by a plaintiff claiming that the trial
court abused its discretion in not awarding treble damages. See, e.g., Reichen-
bach v. Fin. Freedom Ctrs., Inc., No. L-03-1357, 2004 WL 2634624 (Ohio Ct. App.
Nov. 19, 2004).  Presumably a defendant could avoid the discretion of a trial court
if he could show that his facsimile machine somehow malfunctioned, sending
faxes without his knowledge.  The author is unaware of any instances where this
has been argued, or actually happened.  It is also conceivable that a defendant
can claim that his facsimile machine was hijacked by a third party.  But that
would simply change the real party in interest, and not bear on whether the hi-
jacker knowingly sent the faxes.
366. See supra subsection IV.B.1.
367. Covington & Burling v. Int’l Marketing & Research, Inc., No. CIV.A.01-0004360,
2003 WL 21384825, at *8–9 (D.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 17, 2003).  Likely cognizant
that the companies who hired Fax.com to send the advertisements on their behalf
may not have known of the TCPA’s prohibitions, the court did not award treble
damages against the other defendants. Id.
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lawful or that the recipient does not want to receive the faxes.  A
broader application, as suggested by some courts,368 does nothing
more than feed the cottage industry of plaintiffs’ lawyers who are the
only ones who profit from such an interpretation of the Act.
C. Applying Traditional Legal Concepts to Limit Punitive
Recovery
The primary rationale for allowing statutory damage claims is to
incentivize litigation by making small claims feasible to pursue.369
These awards have a two-fold purpose, to compensate the plaintiff for
actual harm done and to impose punitive penalties in hopes of deter-
ring future wrong doing.370  As discussed in section III.B of this Arti-
cle, damages for sending junk faxes can be as many as 30,000 times
the actual harm.  This leads to two questions: (1) should courts read
past the plain language of the statute and examine excessively puni-
tive awards; and (2) when should the court make such an inquiry?
The remainder of this section examines the various challenges a de-
fendant can make to an award of statutory damages, and attempts to
discern the most prudent circumstances for a court to entertain such
damages.
1. Mitigation of Damages
Though the statutory damages of $500–$1,500 per unsolicited fac-
simile was designed to both compensate the recipient and to serve as a
deterrent against continued violation of the TCPA,371 this penalty is
often not enough for cottage industry lawyers.  Lawyers who make
their primary living by bringing TCPA lawsuits, understandably, try
to maximize the income they earn from each case.372  This often re-
sults in waiting until a fax recipient accumulates numerous facsimiles
from the same sender before bringing suit.  These lawyers will some-
times wait months or years before filing their complaint in order to
accumulate multiple facsimiles.373
If the true goal of the facsimile recipients who litigate TCPA
claims, or their lawyers, is—as they claim—to stop receiving these un-
368. See, e.g., Ryan, 879 N.E.2d 765.
369. Sheila B. Scheuerman, Due Process Forgotten: The Problem of Statutory Damages
and Class Actions, 74 MO. L. REV. 103, 107–08 (2009) (“[S]tatutory damages
guarantee a minimum recovery, and thus make a violation that may result in
nominal or no actual damages more attractive to pursue.”).
370. See, e.g., L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Intern., Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 996
(9th Cir. 1998) (“[A]wards of statutory damages serve both compensatory and pu-
nitive purposes.”).
371. See supra section II.C.
372. See supra section V.A.
373. See, e.g., Compoli v. Cumby, Inc., No. CV-01-437886 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl.,
Cuyahoga Cnty. last disposition Mar. 13, 2003).
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solicited advertisements which allegedly cost them paper, toner, and
annoyance, this can often be accomplished with a phone call—not liti-
gation.374  This is especially true when the transmitter of the unsolic-
ited facsimile is an innocent lawbreaker.375  Small businesses have no
incentive to send facsimile advertisements to customers who don’t
want to receive them.  No business wants to annoy potential custom-
ers as these customers may be less inclined to patronize the business
because they may be irritated with the facsimile sender.  So, innocent
lawbreakers have no reason to continue transmitting facsimiles to in-
dividuals or companies who do not want to receive them.
Plaintiffs and their lawyers, however, have the opposite incentive.
That is, they want to continue receiving “unsolicited” facsimile adver-
tisements in order to maximize their statutory damages.  They have
no incentive to contact the transmitter to ask to have their facsimile
number removed from the sender’s database.  This perverse incentive
structure is unique to the anti-junk fax provision of the TCPA and
other similar consumer protection laws.376
Traditional tort law does not allow a plaintiff to recover preventa-
ble damages, instead requiring that the litigant take steps to mitigate,
or reduce, his claimed damages.  Mitigation of damages has been de-
fined by the United States Court of Claims:
A reduction of the amount of damages, not by proof of facts which are a bar
to a part of the plaintiff’s cause of action, or a justification, nor yet of facts
which constitute a cause of action in favor of the defendant, but rather facts
which show that the plaintiff’s conceded cause of action does not entitle him to
so large an amount as the showing on his side would otherwise justify the jury
in allowing him.377
Put more simply: “damages are not recoverable for loss that the
injured party could have avoided without undue risk, burden or hu-
miliation.”378 Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge Co.379 (the “bridge
to nowhere” case) is a fine example of the principle of mitigation.  In
Rockingham, the county awarded Luten Bridge Company a construc-
374. Lawsuit Abuse Hearing, supra note 61, at 174–75 (newspaper article from MONI-
TOR DAILY).
375. As discussed in subsection III.C.2, transmitters of truly fraudulent advertise-
ments (vacation scams, etc.) are unlikely to abide by a request to remove a fac-
simile number from their database.  But as discussed in section V.C, these
operations are rarely defendants in TCPA litigation.
376. For example, the anti-telemarketing provisions of the TCPA only permit a pri-
vate cause of action if the caller disregards a request to remove the recipient’s
phone number from their database. See supra section VI.A.  Similarly, suits in-
volving violations of the “do-not-call” database require that the litigant first af-
firmatively place her phone number into the database, something that takes only
seconds to do. See NATIONAL DO NOT CALL REGISTRY, https://www.donotcall.gov
(last visited Mar. 11, 2011).
377. Motto v. United States 360 F.2d 643, 645 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
378. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350(1) (1981).
379. 35 F.2d 301 (4th Cir. 1929).
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tion contract to build a bridge.380  However, a month later, the county
cancelled not only the contract for the bridge, but decided not to build
the road that the bridge was to be a part of.381  Notwithstanding this
course of action, Luten Bridge Company continued to build the bridge
for another nine months, despite the fact that it was, quite literally, a
bridge to nowhere.382  When it finally stopped construction, it sued to
enforce the contract.383  The court, however, held that the plaintiff’s
recovery was limited to his damages up until the breach occurred, and
that he had a “duty to do nothing to increase [his] damages.”384
Applied to TCPA litigation, courts should not allow a TCPA plain-
tiff to recover additional statutory damages where the defendant (the
fax transmitter) can show that the plaintiff could have easily reduced
(or eliminated) her damages by, for example, calling a toll-free number
or visiting a web-site to request that future transmissions cease.385
This so-called opt-out requirement is not foreign to the TCPA itself.  If
the transmitter and recipient have an established business relation-
ship, the onus shifts to the recipient to notify the sender that he no
longer wishes to receive advertisements.386
TCPA cottage industry lawyers have argued that unsolicited fax
recipients should not be obligated to mitigate their damages because
the Act has no such requirement.387  But the equitable doctrine of mit-
igation of damages developed precisely because no such requirement
existed at law.388
Cottage industry lawyers have also argued that requiring mitiga-
tion through contacting facsimile senders could open recipients to
even more unsolicited advertisements because the opt-out phone num-
ber listed on a facsimile could lead to a data collection service that will
use the caller’s facsimile number to build a database of valid numbers
380. Id. at 302.
381. Id. at 303.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 308; see also Sperry Rand Corp. v. Hill, 356 F.2d 181, 187(1st Cir. 1966)
(holding, in a case for invasion of privacy and libel, that the “plaintiff could not
recover for damages he could have avoided after it became evident that defendant
would continue its advertising campaign”).
385. The FCC rules require that all facsimiles contain the transmitter’s contact infor-
mation.  47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (2010).
386. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) (2010).  To take advantage of this provision, the Act re-
quires that the transmitter have a cost-free mechanism that the recipient can use
to opt-out of future faxes.  47 C.F.R. § 64.1200; see In re Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act. of 1992 Junk Fax Prevention Act of
2005, 21 FCC Rcd. 3787, 3800 (2006); In re Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Tel. Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 18 FCC Rcd 14014 (2003).
387. See, e.g., Mitigation of Damages, TCPALAW.COM (Aug. 2, 2003), http://www.
tcpalaw.com/free/head2.pdf.
388. Motto v. United States, 360 F.2d 643, 645 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
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to which more unsolicited advertisements can be sent.389  Though this
concern may be valid when applied to fraudulent facsimiles,390 it is
unwarranted when the transmitter of the unwanted advertisement is
an innocent lawbreaker—often a local business known to the recipi-
ent.391  The innocent lawbreaker, by definition, will immediately
cease transmitting unwanted facsimiles.392
Requiring TCPA litigants to make a small effort to limit their dam-
ages would significantly reduce potential litigation recovery against
innocent lawbreakers to, in most cases, $500,393 eliminating many of
the concerns raised in this Article.  Enforcing this traditional equita-
ble doctrine would do nothing to impair Congress’ objective in enact-
ing the TCPA, as real violators of the Act could be held accountable
using the Act’s statutory penalty.  Further, it would still allow individ-
uals who received an unwanted, unsolicited advertisement to file suit
in a small claims court, as Congress had envisioned.394
2. Due Process
Lately, some defendants have attempted to fight the TCPA’s statu-
tory damages provisions on due process grounds, arguing that the
statutory damages award is “wholly disproportionate” to the actual
389. Commonly Asked Questions About Junk Faxing, JUNKFAX.ORG, http://
www.junkfax.org/fax/basic_info/ junk_fax_qa.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2011).
Some of the information found on this page is displayed below:
Q. Should I call the opt out (removal) number?  Unplug my fax machine
for a week?
A. It depends on the broadcaster.  Typically, calling the removal number
will put you on the stop list for that ONE advertiser.  But in general, the
best advice is NOT to call the removal number . . . the cure might be
worse than the disease!  It also tells them you read your faxes and they
aren’t wasting their time.  Here are some real stories:
I was only getting a few each week until I started calling the opt out
numbers.  Now I’m deluged with them and am ready to sue.  If it’s
illegal, why can’t they be stopped?
I used to get one stock report fax a month or every couple of weeks,
then I started calling the removal 800 numbers at the bottom.  And
now I am getting at least one a day.  I have started keeping them and
am trying to track down where they are coming from.  Bit (sic) it
seems the more I call the removal #s the more faxes i (sic) get.  Please
help.
Id.
390. See supra subsection III.C.2.
391. See supra subsection V.D.4.a.
392. If the transmitter fails to honor the request, he is no longer an innocent
lawbreaker.
393. For a discussion of statutory treble damages for “willful” violations of the TCPA,
see supra subsection VII.B.2.
394. 137 CONG. REC. S16205–06 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hollings).
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harm suffered.395  This wholly disproportionate language is somewhat
misleading; the language has led several lower courts to apply the
standard,396 which was elucidated in St. Louis Iron Mountain &
Southern Railway Co. v. Williams.397  As explained more fully below,
this wholly disproportionate analysis is inappropriate—especially in
the context of the innocent law breaker—because it fails to account for
the fact that the Supreme Court has recently shied away from using
“public harm” as an adequate justification for an award to withstand a
due process challenge.
In St. Louis Railway, the Supreme Court examined a due process
challenge to a Congressional statute regulating the rates an interstate
railway could charge.398  The defendant charged and collected sixty-
six cents above the statutorily mandated maximum fee.399  The pas-
senger brought suit under the act, which authorized statutory dam-
ages of “not less than fifty dollars and not more than three hundred
dollars for the offense.”400  The railway was found to have violated the
Act and ordered to pay statutory damages of seventy-five dollars.401
The Supreme Court analyzed the statute under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, reasoning that because the fine
was “imposed as a punishment for the violation of a public law, the
Legislature [could] adjust its amount to the public wrong rather than
the private injury.”402  The Court went on to hold that these legisla-
tive enactments “transcend the (due process) limitation only where
the penalty prescribed is so severe and oppressive as to be wholly dis-
proportioned to the offense and obviously unreasonable.”403
The Court underscored the “public harm” rationale in closing:
When [the penalty] is considered with due regard for the interests of the
public, the numberless opportunities for committing the offense, and the need
for securing uniform adherence to established passenger rates, we think it
properly cannot be said to be so severe and oppressive as to be wholly dispro-
portioned to the offense or obviously unreasonable.404
This is the key underpinning the Court’s analysis in St. Louis Rail-
way: that because the legislature weighed the matter and thought
that the public harm to be averted justified the imposition of the stat-
utory damage amount, the Court should meddle no further.
395. See, e.g., Centerline Equip. Corp. v. Banner Pers. Serv., Inc., 545 F. Supp. 2d 768,
777 (N.D. Ill. 2008); Accounting Outsourcing, LLC v. Verizon Wireless Pers.
Commc’ns, L.P., 329 F. Supp. 2d 789, 809-10 (M.D. La. 2004).
396. Scheuerman, supra note 369, at 123.
397. 251 U.S. 63 (1919).
398. Id.
399. Id. at 64.
400. Id. at 64.
401. Id.
402. Id. at 66.
403. Id.
404. Id. at 67.
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But the more recent cases of TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Re-
sources Corp.,405 BMW of North America v. Gore,406and State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell407 significantly under-
cut this rationale.408 Campbell and Gore reiterate the fact that exem-
plary damages should bear some relation to actual damages,409 and
Gore held, rather explicitly, that: “punitive damages may not be
grossly out of proportion to the severity of the offense.”410
Yet despite these admonitions, one of the few courts to directly con-
strue a due process challenge to the TCPA continued to apply the
wholly disproportionate standard from St. Louis Railway.  In Account-
ing Outsourcing, LLC v. Verizon Wireless Personal Communications,
L.P.411 the court upheld the TCPA’s statutory damages provisions for
junk faxes against a due process argument grounded in Gore and
Campbell.  The court explained that “[a]t the heart of the Court’s rul-
ings in those cases was the concern that persons receive fair notice
regarding the nature and severity of the punishment inflicted upon
them.”412  While this was a concern of the Supreme Court, it was only
one concern.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the Due Process
Clause encompasses both a substantive and a procedural component
when it comes to the imposition of damages.413  Specifically, “the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes substantive
limits ‘beyond which penalties may not go.’”414
405. 509 U.S. 443 (1993) (plurality opinion).
406. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
407. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
408. See also S.W. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S. 482, 490 (1905) (ruling that
where a telephone company acted in complete good faith in adopting a regulation,
the infliction of “penalties aggregating $6,300 was so plainly arbitrary and op-
pressive as to be nothing short of a taking of its property without due process of
law”).
409. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 426 (“In sum, courts must ensure that the measure of pun-
ishment is both reasonable and proportionate to the amount of harm to the plain-
tiff and to the general damages recovered.”); Gore, 517 U.S. at 575 (“As the Court
stated nearly 150 years ago, exemplary damages imposed on a defendant should
reflect the enormity of his offense.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 363 (1852)).
410. Gore, 517 U.S. at 576 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
411. 329 F. Supp. 2d 789 (M.D. La. 2004).
412. Id. at 808–09.
413. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 465 (1993) (plurality
opinion) (analyzing the defendant’s contention that the award was excessive both
substantively and procedurally). But see id. at 470–71 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (ar-
guing that there is no “substantive due process right that punitive damages be
reasonable”).
414. Id. at 453–54 (quoting Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Seegers, 207 U.S. 73 (1907)).
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Indeed, the court in Verizon Wireless conflates the inquiry from
Gore and Campbell into one solely of notice.415  But this misinter-
prets—and severely short-changes—the language and thrust of
Campbell.  In Campbell, the Court noted that “it is well established
that there are procedural and substantive constitutional limitations
on these awards.”416  Furthermore, “[t]he Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the imposition of grossly excessive
or arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor.”417
While it is true that the Court in both Gore and Campbell couches
its analysis in procedural due process terms, the analyses themselves
shout substance.  The Court in Gore announced the formulation of
three “guideposts” under which courts should evaluate punitive dam-
age awards.418  In finding that the jury’s $2 million punitive damage
award against BMW was “grossly excessive,” the Court looked to: (1)
the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, (2) the dis-
parity between the harm or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff
and his punitive damage award, and (3) the difference between this
remedy and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable
cases.419  The Court reiterated the propriety of these guideposts sev-
eral years later in Campbell.420
Although the Court in Gore points out that each of the three guide-
posts “indicates that BMW did not receive adequate notice of the mag-
nitude of the sanction” the State could impose,421 it fails to mention
what these guideposts have to do with providing the defendant no-
tice.422  A closer look at the factors themselves, reveals the Court’s
hand.
The first factor, the degree of reprehensibility, is “[p]erhaps the
most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages
award.”423 It reflects the idea that “some wrongs are more blamewor-
thy than others,”424 and “the principle that punitive damages may not
415. Verizon Wireless, 329 F. Supp. 2d at 808–09 (“At the heart of the Court’s rulings
in those cases was the concern that persons receive fair notice regarding the na-
ture and severity of the punishment inflicted upon them.”).
416. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003).
417. Id.
418. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574–75 (1996).
419. Id. at 575.
420. 538 U.S. at 418.
421. Gore, 517 U.S. at 574.
422. See J. Cam Barker, Note, Grossly Excessive Penalties in the Battle Against Illegal
File-Sharing: The Troubling Effects of Aggregating Minimum Statutory Damages
for Copyright Infringement, 83 TEX. L. REV. 525, 541 (2004) (“[B]oth commenta-
tors and the Court itself state that Gore imposed a substantive due process limit
on the size of punitive awards.”).
423. Gore, 517 U.S. at 575.
424. Id. at 575.
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be grossly out of proportion to the severity of the offense.”425  The
Court determines reprehensibility by looking for several factors: (1)
whether the harm was physical or economic; (2) whether the defen-
dant was reckless or indifferent to the health and safety of others in
his conduct; (3) whether the target of the defendant’s conduct was fi-
nancially vulnerable; (4) whether the defendant’s conduct involved re-
peated actions or was an isolated incident; and (5) whether the harm
was the result of malice, trickery or deceit, or was just plain
accidental.426
The Court then looks at the “ratio to the actual harm inflicted on
the plaintiff.”427  This line of inquiry reflects the Court’s adherence to
“[t]he principle that exemplary damages must bear a ‘reasonable rela-
tionship’ to compensatory damages.”428  While the Court declined to
specify a hard and fast limit to the ratio, it noted that “[a] higher ratio
may also be justified in cases in which the injury is hard to detect or
the monetary value of noneconomic harm might have been difficult to
determine.”429  Finally, “[c]omparing the punitive damages award and
the civil or criminal penalties that could be imposed for comparable
misconduct provides a third indicium of excessiveness.”430
As much as the district court in Verizon Wireless would like to con-
fine these precepts to the venerable grounds of due process, the writ-
ing is unmistakably clear: there are now “substantive limits beyond
which penalties may not go.”431  Justice Scalia points this out in his
concurrence to TXO.432  His ire grows ever more forceful in Gore: “By
today’s logic, every dispute as to evidentiary sufficiency in a state civil
suit poses a question of constitutional moment, subject to review in
this Court.  That is a stupefying proposition.”433  By the time the
Court decides Campbell, Justice Scalia is forced to be blunt: “the Due
Process Clause provides no substantive protection against ‘excessive’
or ‘unreasonable’ awards of punitive damages.”434
So what does all this mean for the innocent lawbreaker?  It should
certainly give pause—although, it has not yet—to courts that are con-
tent to apply the wholly disproportionate standard to statutory dam-
425. Id. at 576 (internal quotation marks omitted).
426. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003).
427. Gore, 517 U.S. at 580.
428. Id.
429. Id. at 582 (emphasis added).
430. Id. at 583 (emphasis added).
431. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453–54 (1993) (internal
quotations omitted).
432. Id. at 470 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I do not, however, join the plurality opinion,
since it makes explicit what was implicit in Haslip: the existence of a so-called
‘substantive due process’ right that punitive damages be reasonable.”).
433. Gore, 517 U.S. at 607 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
434. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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ages.  Though they are formally different, functionally, statutory
damages serve the same purpose as punitive damages: to punish and
deter wrongdoers.  Certainly, a portion of the statutory damages goes
towards compensating the victim.  But above this, the stated reason
for the TCPA’s statutory damages provision is deterrence.435
Because the due process limitations identified by the Supreme
Court are not merely procedural—much to Justice Scalia’s and the
court in Verizon Wireless’s chagrin—they inquire into whether awards
of statutory damages should not be confined to the archaic wholly dis-
proportionate standard of St. Louis Railway.
Moreover, the rationale for more closely scrutinizing a statutory
damages award gains more force when courts deal with aggregated
statutory damages, like those facing the innocent lawbreaker.  Often,
an unwitting small business owner will send out a facsimile advertise-
ment—which he thinks is completely legitimate—to one or several re-
cipients and, not being told to stop, he will send more.  The recipients
will either hoard these junk faxes or forward them to one of the cot-
tage industry lawyers.436  After accumulating enough of these from a
single innocent lawbreaker to make it worth the attorney’s time to file
suit, he does so by filing, for example, a claim for receiving dozens of
faxes.437
Congress is legislating these statutory damages in the abstract, in
an effort to deter and punish this type of unwanted conduct.  The jury,
in awarding punitive damages, is deterring and punishing the of-
fender in front of them.  Yet, as the Supreme Court has stated in Gore,
Campbell, TSO, and Cooper Industry v. Leatherman Tool Group,438
punitive damages exceeding even a 4:1 ratio may be excessive.  So how
can the innocent lawbreaker, who presumably Congress didn’t mean
to catch when it cast this broad net, receive less protection under the
due process clause than the willful lawbreaker who engages in far
more reprehensible conduct?
Many courts439 and commentators440 argue that the most appro-
priate time for a defendant to bring a due process challenge to their
exposure under the TCPA’s statutory damages provision is after the
court renders a determination on liability.  In reality, though, this is
435. See supra section II.C.
436. See supra section V.A.
437. See supra section V.A.
438. 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
439. See, e.g., Centerline Equip. Corp. v. Banner Pers. Serv., Inc., 545 F. Supp. 2d 768,
778 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (“It is premature at this stage (a motion to dismiss) to con-
sider whether any hypothetical award might be constitutionally excessive.”).
440. See, e.g., Chad R. Bowman, Litigating Facsimile Advertising, 26-NOV COMM. LAW
1, 23 (2008) (“The most persuasive time for a successful due process challenge . . .
is likely after class certification and a liability determination for an amount far in
excess of actual harm.”).
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an imprudent time for such a determination, especially in the context
of a class-action, or when the damages will clearly force the defendant
into a “bet-the-company” scenario.  Delaying such a determination un-
til after trial places enormous pressure on the defendants to settle.
When analyzing the timing of a due-process challenge, courts will
often look to the rationale utilized in examining punitive damages
cases.441  They reason that it is inappropriate to address excessive-
ness claims at the early stages of litigation and, even if statutory dam-
ages prove to be excessive, the proper remedy is simply a reduction in
those damages after the verdict.442
At least one commentator, however, has argued that deferring this
analysis is inappropriate for a number of reasons, chief among them
being that while punitive damages are not actually known at the
pleading stage, statutory damages are “a mere mathematical exer-
cise.”443  As such, there is little reason to delay the due process analy-
sis and force the defendants to proceed with what may very well be a
multi-billion dollar cloud of potential liability over their heads.
Although Scheuerman’s analysis comes in the context of class cer-
tification, the same logic should apply to innocent lawbreakers.  Since
these are often small business owners, even a class action suit for sev-
eral hundred thousand dollars would be enough to force them into
bankruptcy.  The threat of such substantial liability would, under-
standably, create a powerful incentive to settle the suit, rather than
risk devastating liability with a guilty verdict.
3. Statute of Limitations Issues
Courts generally hold that state statutes of limitations apply to
claims brought under the TCPA because of the state opt-out provision,
noting:
Under the opt out interpretation of section 227(b)(3) that we now have
adopted, parties may assert private TCPA claims in an appropriate state
court if state law permits.  Therefore, if Texas limitations law does not permit
the Recipients to pursue their claims . . . , then the Recipients’ claims are not
‘otherwise permitted’ by [state] law.”444
This issue is most important in considering whether class actions
are allowed in TCPA litigation because residents of a state with a
shorter statute of limitations may circumvent their state’s rules by
joining an out-of-state or national class action.
441. Scheuerman, supra note 372, at 127 (“[M]ost courts defer decision on the due
process question until after class certification.  Here, courts conveniently find pu-
nitive damages jurisprudence relevant.”).
442. See Centerline, 545 F. Supp. 2d at 778; cf. Texas v. Am. Blastfax, Inc., 164 F.
Supp. 2d 892 (W.D. Tex. 2003) (reducing what would have been a $2.34 billion
award at $500 per fax to an award of $459,375, or seven cents per fax).
443. Scheuerman, supra note 369, at 147.
444. Chair King Inc. v. GTE, 135 S.W.3d 365, 390–91 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004).
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4. Remittitur
Another avenue through which courts may be able to deal with ex-
cessive damages is through remittitur.  Remittitur “is the process by
which a court compels a plaintiff to choose between reduction of an
excessive verdict and a new trial.”445  But this option is available only
where the verdict is “so grossly excessive as to shock the conscience of
the court.”446  And the plaintiff must be willing to accept the remitted
damage award because the election of a new trial is limited to the de-
termination of damages.447
Generally, district courts may only remit a damages award that is
“clearly excessive,” or that “shock[s] the judicial conscience of the
court.”448  While some may argue that remittitur is inappropriate in
statutory damages cases, district courts have often flatly rejected this
argument.449  But almost no court has been willing to employ (or even
discuss) remittitur in TCPA cases.450  This may be because if the
plaintiff chooses a new trial on damages instead of accepting the re-
duced judgment amount proposed by the court, the measure of dam-
ages would still be the statutory penalty. The possibility of remittitur
also does little to help innocent lawbreakers who are forced to settle
rather than pay the legal fees required to go to trial.
For those innocent lawbreakers who can and do defend TCPA
cases—especially class actions—at trial, remittitur remains a viable
procedure that should be presented to the trial court.  The potential of
additional attorney’s fees that would have to be incurred by the plain-
tiff in re-trying the damages case may persuade the plaintiff to accept
a reduced damages amount.  Unfortunately, as explored in this Arti-
cle, most of the cottage industry lawyers do not have “real” clients in-
curring fees.451  Instead it is the lawyers themselves who are the real
445. Earl v. Bouchard Transp. Co., 917 F.2d 1320, 1328 (2d Cir. 1990) (internal cita-
tions omitted).
446. Eich v. Bd. of Regents for Cent. Mo. State Univ., 350 F.3d 752, 763 (8th Cir.
2003).
447. See generally Capital Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1051
(D. Minn. 2010) (“[I]f this Court does order remittitur, it [must] also offer Plain-
tiffs the option of choosing to reject the remittitur and exercise their right to a
new jury trial solely on the issue of damages.”).
448. Gregory v. Shelby Cnty., 220 F.3d 433, 443 (6th Cir. 2000).
449. See, e.g., Capital Records, 680 F. Supp. 2d at 1051 (noting that “there is no au-
thority for Plaintiffs’ assertion that the Court does not have the power to remit an
award of statutory damages”); Sony BMG Music Ent. v. Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp.
2d 85, 94 n.8 (D. Mass. 2010) (“Although I do not employ the remittitur proce-
dure, I reject the plaintiffs’ contention that it is unavailable in cases where a jury
has returned a statutory damages award under the Copyright Act.”).
450. See, e.g., Centerline Equip. Corp. v. Banner Personnel Serv., Inc., 545 F. Supp. 2d
768, 778 n.6 (N.D. Ill. 2008); Irvine v. Akron Beacon Journal, 770 N.E.2d 1105,
1117 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002).
451. See generally supra section V.A.
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parties in interest and thus have little incentive to abandon the poten-
tial for a higher recovery.
D. Eliminate or Limit Private Enforcement Mechanism
As should be evident at this point in the Article, the TCPA’s pri-
vate enforcement mechanism, and its associated statutory damages,
creates injury to innocent lawbreakers that exceeds the harm the Act
was designed to mitigate.  The simplest solution to repairing this im-
balance is legislative.  But a legislative fix is never simple.  The 2005
enactment of the JFPA demonstrates that as recently as five years
ago, Congress still believed that the underlying rationale for the
TCPA and its high statutory penalties was sound.452  Or at least that
the innocent lawbreaker lobby—if such a thing exists—was not strong
enough to move the TCPA’s enforcement mechanism closer to that of
the CAN-SPAM Act, which does not have a private enforcement
mechanism.453
Though I advocate the elimination of the TCPA’s private right of
action, such legislation is unlikely so long as legislators believe it is
their duty to try to eliminate even the minor annoyances of everyday
life.454  But even without striking the private enforcement provision
from the TCPA, Congress can adopt many of the suggestions discussed
here to lessen the harsh impact of the TCPA on innocent lawbreakers.
For example, Congress can clarify the TCPA’s definitions to ex-
clude facsimiles received using computer fax servers from its reach,
require consumers who do not wish to receive any commercial adver-
tising by fax to place their telephone facsimile numbers on the already
established and successful do-not-call registry, and revise the stan-
dard under which treble damages can be awarded to cover only egre-
gious violators of the Act.  These relatively minor fixes would go a long
way in restoring balance to the enforcement of the TCPA by eliminat-
ing many of the meritless suits brought by the TCPA cottage industry,
while still keeping the junk-fax industry (or what remains of it) at bay.
These legislative revisions would also severely hamper the TCPA cot-
tage industry, requiring lawyers who make their living attacking in-
nocent lawbreakers to find real clients with more meritorious claims.
452. See supra subsection II.C.3.
453. See supra section VI.B.
454. Even without the TCPA, consumers or businesses that have actually been
harmed by the receipt of unsolicited facsimiles have legal recourse under ordi-
nary state tort law.  Whether Congress has (or should have) the Constitutional
authority to regulate private facsimile transmissions under the Commerce
Clause is left to another article.
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E. Limits on Private Enforcement by the States
Though it is unlikely that Congress will act to eliminate or limit
the private right of action, the negative impact on innocent lawbreak-
ers can also be lessened by state legislatures.  Jurisdiction over the
private right of action is vested in state courts that choose to permit
it.455  Courts have consistently interpreted this delegation of jurisdic-
tion as not requiring states to opt-in.456  In other words, state courts
are presumed to have jurisdiction over private TCPA claims.457  But
there appears to be no reason that state legislatures could not, with-
out completely opting out of jurisdiction, limit what state courts can
hear TCPA cases.  If a state legislature were to statutorily restrict
TCPA claims to small claim courts458—as intended by Congress459—
the maximum damages to which an innocent lawbreaker could be sub-
ject would be greatly limited.460  Such a restriction would limit the
potential impact of TCPA litigation on small businesses, while having
no detrimental effect on the prosecution of major blast faxers by the
FCC or state attorneys generals who can bring enforcement actions in
federal court.461
VIII. CONCLUSION
There is little doubt that the legislators who enacted the TCPA had
only benevolent intent when they sought to ban the annoyance, dis-
traction, and cost shifting associated with unsolicited facsimile adver-
tisements.  There can also be little doubt that those congresspersons
never anticipated the changes in technology and growth of a cottage
industry of plaintiffs’ lawyers that would fundamentally alter the op-
eration of the TCPA in the two decades since its passage.  But these
factors have changed the TCPA from a consumer protection statute to
a law that is often used by unscrupulous lawyers to target small busi-
nesses who, at worst, may have unwittingly caused some annoyance
by sending some facsimile advertisements.
455. See supra subsection II.C.2.b.
456. See supra subsection II.C.2.b.
457. See supra subsection II.C.2.b.
458. The term small claims court is used to describe the lowest level court of a state
where litigants can appear without counsel to resolve relatively minor disputes
that often involve only money damages.  Though states may label this type of a
court with different names, every state has such a limited jurisdiction court.
459. See 137 CONG. REC. S16205–06 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hol-
lings) (explaining that the Act was to provide a private cause of action for a con-
sumer to pursue in small claims court).
460. The maximum monetary jurisdiction of state courts varies from $1,500 in Ken-
tucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24A.230 (West 2010), to $15,000 in Georgia, GA.
CODE ANN. § 15-10-2 (2008).
461. See supra subsection II.C.2.a.
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Though the TCPA has well served the purpose of almost eliminat-
ing the junk-fax industry, it was largely the actions of state attorneys
generals and the FCC that accomplished this laudable goal.  Private
enforcement actions have done little to help consumers—instead bene-
fiting lawyers and professional litigants to pad their pockets with
money taken from innocent lawbreakers.  The use of the traditional
telephone facsimile machine as the best means of instantaneous writ-
ten communication has largely been overtaken by Adobe PDF docu-
ments attached to electronic mail messages.  But while the harm of
unwanted facsimiles has declined, the litigation driven by the cottage
industry of plaintiffs’ lawyers has continued.  If Congress does not act
to reform the TCPA to limit the detrimental effects of the Act on small
businesses, courts must step in to bring balance to the interests of
consumers and innocent lawbreakers.  Courts must carefully examine
each TCPA case to ensure that true violators of the Act are held ac-
countable and that innocent lawbreakers are not unfairly harmed for
innocent mistakes.
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VIV. APPENDIX A
Name of Court State First Case Fax Phn. Und. Total
U.S.D.C. Northern District of Alabama AL 8/4/2005 1 1 2 4
U.S.D.C. Southern District of Alabama AL 6/20/2007 0 0 3 3
Cobb County Court GA 12/3/2003 1 1 0 2
DeKalb County Court GA 3/29/2004 1 0 0 1
Fulton County Superior Court GA 3/20/2008 1 0 0 1
Travis County District Court TX 10/9/2003 6 1 0 7
Baltimore City Circuit Court MD 1/28/2005 7 0 0 7
Baltimore County Circuit Court MD 4/21/2008 1 0 0 1
U.S.D.C. Maryland MD 5/30/2008 2 0 0 2
Jefferson County District Court TX 6/10/2004 1 0 0 1
Suffolk County Superior Court MA 9/25/2007 3 0 0 3
Santa Cruz County Superior Court CA 8/26/2004 1 0 0 1
Mercer County Superior Court NJ 2/13/2008 1 0 0 1
Somerset County Superior Court NJ 8/31/2005 0 1 0 1
Franklin County Court of Common Pleas OH 7/11/2005 6 21 0 27
Lucas County Court of Common Pleas OH 2/20/2008 1 0 0 1
Montgomery County Court of Common OH 8/2/2005 6 0 0 6
Pleas
U.S.D.C. Southern District of Ohio OH 11/20/2006 0 4 1 5
U.S.D.C. Northern District of Illinois IL 2/17/2005 2 1 28 31
DuPage County Circuit Court IL 4/28/2004 17 0 0 17
Kane County Circuit Court IL 11/5/2004 2 0 0 2
Kendall County Circuit Court IL 6/9/2004 3 0 0 3
Lake County Circuit Court IL 6/1/2004 47 0 0 47
Butler County Court of Common Pleas OH 7/19/2005 0 5 0 5
Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas OH 11/23/2005 8 0 0 8
U.S.D.C. Northern District of Ohio OH 10/12/2004 7 0 0 7
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas OH 11/9/2003 468 13 6 487
Lake County Court of Common Pleas OH 7/12/2004 205 0 0 205
Portage County Court of Common Pleas OH 3/7/2005 3 0 0 3
Summit County Court of Common Pleas OH 6/23/2005 18 0 0 18
Cook County Circuit Court IL 4/7/2003 200 3 9 212
Dallas County District Court TX 2/1/2005 2 0 0 2
38th Judicial District of Montgomery PA 5/9/2008 1 0 0 1
County
Arapahoe County District Court CO 3/7/2006 11 0 1 11
Boulder County District Court CO 5/27/2005 1 0 0 1
Denver County District Court CO 3/30/2005 19 0 3 22
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Name of Court State First Case Fax Phn. Und. Total
El Paso County District Court CO 3/28/2008 0 0 1 1
Jefferson County District Court CO 3/23/2005 1 0 0 1
U.S.D.C. Colorado CO 5/15/2003 31 0 6 37
U.S.D.C. Eastern District of New York NY 9/28/2004 7 0 0 7
17th Circuit Broward County FL 7/31/2003 12 0 0 12
Kent County Circuit Court MI 1/9/2008 0 1 0 1
16th Circuit Court Macomb County MI 12/13/2004 0 1 0 1
22nd Circuit Court Washtenaw County MI 8/30/2005 0 1 0 1
6th Circuit Court Oakland County MI 6/18/2006 3 1 0 4
Howard County Circuit Court MD 5/12/2005 1 0 0 1
Montgomery County Circuit Court MD 2/22/2005 5 5 0 10
Harris County District Court TX 9/9/2004 0 2 0 2
U.S.D.C. Southern District of Texas TX 7/31/2006 0 1 2 3
Madison County Circuit Court IL 8/9/2005 2 1 0 3
St. Clair County Circuit Court IL 10/18/2007 0 1 0 1
U.S.D.C. Central District of Illinois IL 2/20/2008 1 0 0 1
U.S.D.C. Southern District of Illinois IL 11/7/2007 0 0 1 1
Marion County IN 2/17/2005 1 0 0 1
U.S.D.C. Southern District of Indiana IN 6/8/2005 1 0 0 1
Riverside County Superior Court CA 9/14/2007 1 0 0 1
Jackson County Circuit Court MO 12/22/2004 10 0 0 10
Kings County Supreme Court NY 3/27/2003 1 0 0 1
U.S.D.C. Central District of California CA 4/11/2006 4 0 6 10
Los Angeles Superior Court Central CA 9/11/2003 5 0 23 28
District
U.S.D.C. Middle District of Louisiana LA 8/14/2007 5 0 0 5
11th Judicial Circuit Court of Florida FL 6/12/2003 0 1 4 5
Middlesex County Superior Court MA 7/12/2007 0 1 0 1
Norfolk County Superior Court MA 9/20/2005 1 0 0 1
Ramsey County District Court MN 2/6/2008 1 0 0 1
U.S.D.C. Minnesota MN 9/16/2005 0 0 1 1
Clark County District Court NV 10/27/2003 20 0 0 20
U.S.D.C. District of Massachusetts MA 6/6/2007 1 0 0 1
New Haven Superior Court CT 1/18/2005 1 0 0 1
Morris County Superior Court NJ 2/25/2008 0 1 0 1
U.S.D.C. Southern District of New York NY 4/15/2005 1 1 2 4
New York County Supreme Court NY 3/16/2006 1 0 0 1
Alameda County Superior Court CA 3/16/2005 4 1 0 5
Contra Costa County Superior Court CA 3/12/2004 1 0 0 1
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Name of Court State First Case Fax Phn. Und. Total
Bessemer County AL 11/9/2006 1 0 0 1
Jefferson County AL 7/30/2003 14 1 0 15
Cleveland County OK 1/26/2007 0 1 0 1
Orange County Superior Court CA 3/10/2006 20 1 0 21
U.S.D.C. District of Oregon OR 5/12/2005 0 1 0 1
U.S.D.C. Eastern District of Pennsylvania PA 10/20/2003 23 0 5 28
First Judicial District of Pennsylvania PA 2/14/2005 13 0 0 13
Maricopa County Superior Court AZ 3/25/2005 8 0 2 10
U.S.D.C. District of Arizona, Phoenix AZ 10/15/2003 2 2 0 4
U.S.D.C. Middle District of Pennsylvania PA 8/23/2006 0 1 0 1
Queens County Supreme Court NY 7/1/2004 1 0 0 1
Sacramento County Superior Court CA 8/31/2005 5 1 0 6
U.S.D.C. Southern District of California CA 9/18/2003 0 5 10 15
San Diego County Superior Court CA 7/22/2003 67 33 57 157
U.S.D.C. Northern District of California CA 11/6/2003 2 3 1 6
San Francisco County Superior Court CA 8/25/2003 4 32 3 39
King County Superior Court WA 12/15/2003 25 0 0 25
San Mateo County Superior Court CA 11/16/2004 1 0 0 1
Santa Clara County Superior Court CA 7/15/2004 6 4 2 12
Richland County Court of Common Pleas SC 2/14/2008 0 2 0 2
Greenville County Court of Common Pleas SC 9/20/2005 1 0 0 1
St. Louis County Circuit Court MO 2/15/2005 18 1 0 19
U.S.D.C. Eastern District of Missouri MO 7/10/2003 0 0 3 3
U.S.D.C. Eastern District of North NC 8/24/2004 0 0 0 0
Carolina
Wake County Superior Court NC 8/19/2005 4 0 0 4
4th Judicial District Court Utah County UT 5/9/2006 1 0 0 1
U.S.D.C. Eastern District of Virginia VA 7/20/2007 1 0 0 1
U.S.D.C. Southern District of West WV 9/25/2007 0 0 1 1
Virginia
District of Columbia Superior Court DC 4/13/2005 1 0 0 1
U.S.D.C. District of Columbia DC 8/15/2003 2 0 1 2
